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ABSTRACT 
1. This report presents a detailed analysis of changes in both poverty and inequality since the fall of 
Apartheid, and the potential drivers of such developments. Use is made of national survey data from 1993, 
2000 and 2008. These data show that South Africa’s high aggregate level of income inequality increased 
between 1993 and 2008. The same is true of inequality within each of South Africa’s four major racial 
groups. Income poverty has fallen slightly in the aggregate but it persists at acute levels for the African and 
Coloured racial groups. Poverty in urban areas has increased. There have been continual improvements in 
non-monetary well-being (for example, access to piped water, electricity and formal housing) over the 
entire post-Apartheid period up to 2008. 
2. From a policy point of view it is important to flag the fact that intra-African inequality and 
poverty trends increasingly dominate aggregate inequality and poverty in South Africa. Race-based 
redistribution may become less effective over time relative to policies addressing increasing inequality 
within each racial group and especially within the African group. Rising inequality within the labour 
market – due both to rising unemployment and rising earnings inequality - lies behind rising levels of 
aggregate inequality. These labour market trends have prevented the labour market from playing a positive 
role in poverty alleviation. Social assistance grants (mainly the child support grant, the disability grant and 
the old-age pension) alter the levels of inequality only marginally but have been crucial in reducing 
poverty among the poorest households. There are still a large number of families that are ineligible for 
grants because of the lack of appropriate documents. This suggests that there is an important role for the 
Department of Home Affairs in easing the process of vital registration. 
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RÉSUMÉ 
3. Ce rapport présente une analyse détaillée de l’évolution de la pauvreté et des inégalités depuis la 
fin de l’Apartheid et des facteurs susceptibles de l’expliquer. Les comparaisons ont été effectuées sur la 
base des dernières micro-données comparables sur les ménages de 1993, 2000 et 2008. Ces données 
montrent que le niveau global des inégalités de revenu de l’Afrique du Sud a continué d’augmenter entre 
1993 et 2008. Cette même réalité des inégalités se retrouvent également dans chacun des quatre groupes 
ethniques d’Afrique du Sud. La pauvreté a légèrement chuté dans sa globalité, mais persiste gravement 
parmi les groupes ethniques africains et interraciaux. La pauvreté en zone urbaine a augmenté. 
L’amélioration du bien-être non monétaire (accès à l’eau courante, à l’électricité, à un logement formel 
etc.) s’est poursuivie jusqu’en 2008. 
4. D'un point de vue de politique publique, il est important de signaler que les inégalités et la 
pauvreté au sein de la population africaine ont et auront de plus en plus un poids prépondérant dans les 
inégalités et la pauvreté globales du pays. L'augmentation des inégalités au sein du marché du travail - due 
à la fois à la hausse du chômage et à l'augmentation des inégalités de salaires -  provient de l'augmentation 
du niveau global des inégalités. Ces tendances ont empêché le marché du travail de jouer son rôle positif en 
termes de réduction de la pauvreté. Les prestations d’aide sociale (essentiellement l’allocation pour enfant 
à charge et les pensions d’invalidité et de vieillesse) n’ont qu’une incidence marginale sur les inégalités et 
la pauvreté. Toutefois, ces transferts réduisent réellement l’écart de pauvreté, en particulier parmi les 
ménages les plus pauvres. Un grand nombre de familles qui pourraient prétendre aux allocations familiales 
ne font pas valoir leurs droits parce qu’elles ne disposent pas des pièces justificatives requises.  Par 
conséquent, le ministère des Affaires intérieures (Department of Home Affairs) a un rôle important à jouer 
en ce sens qu’il peut faciliter le processus d’enregistrement à l’état civil pour que tous les enfants puissent 
accéder aux prestations d’aide sociale auxquelles ils ont droit. 
 
 
DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2010)1 
 6
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................................ 3 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................... 4 
RÉSUMÉ ........................................................................................................................................................ 5 
TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICAN INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY  SINCE THE FALL OF 
APARTHEID .................................................................................................................................................. 9 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 9 
CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICAN INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY SINCE THE FALL OF APARTHEID................................................ 12 
1.1 A long run-empirical picture of changes in inequality and poverty by race using census data...... 12 
1.2 Evidence about post-Apartheid inequality and poverty trends from national household  
survey data ...................................................................................................................................... 15 
1.3 Explaining Changes in Post-Apartheid Inequality ......................................................................... 19 
1.4 Alternatives to the money-metric picture ....................................................................................... 20 
1.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 21 
CHAPTER 2: AN EMPIRICAL DESCRIPTION OF INEQUALITY AND POVERTY OVER THE  
POST-APARTHEID PERIOD ..................................................................................................................... 22 
2.1 Data and Methods ........................................................................................................................... 22 
2.2 Trends in Inequality ........................................................................................................................ 24 
2.3 Trends in Poverty ........................................................................................................................... 35 
2.4 Evidence from NIDS on non-money-metric poverty ..................................................................... 43 
2.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 45 
CHAPTER 3: THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE GRANTS IN REDUCING POVERTY  
AND INEQUALITY .................................................................................................................................... 47 
3.1 The Unemployment Insurance Fund .............................................................................................. 47 
3.2 Public Works Programmes ............................................................................................................. 49 
3.3 Social Assistance Grants ................................................................................................................ 53 
3.3.1 Child grants ............................................................................................................................... 54 
3.3.2 Other child grants ...................................................................................................................... 55 
3.3.3 Profile of recipients of child grants ........................................................................................... 56 
3.3.4 Social assistance for the elderly ................................................................................................ 60 
3.3.5 The impact of the grants on poverty ......................................................................................... 61 
3.4 The impact of social assistance grants on education, health and labour supply ............................. 63 
3.4.1 Impact on education .................................................................................................................. 63 
3.4.2 Impact on health ........................................................................................................................ 64 
3.4.3 Impact on labour force participation ......................................................................................... 65 
3.5 Policy simulation exercise .............................................................................................................. 66 
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 68 
 DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2010)1 
 7
ANNEX I: DESCRIPTION OF DATA ........................................................................................................ 70 
ANNEX II: A DECOMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD LABOUR MARKET INCOME ........................... 73 
ANNEX III: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES ............................................................................. 75 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................. 86 
 
 
Tables 
Table 1.1: A compilation of estimates of annual per capita personal income by race group in 2000 
Rands and relative to White levels, 1917-2008 .................................................................... 13 
Table 1.2: Gini coefficients by race and location, 2004 ......................................................................... 16 
Table 1.3: Selected indicators of poverty, assuming poverty line of R3000 per capita per year (in 
constant 2000 prices) ............................................................................................................ 18 
Table 1.4: Changes in access to housing, water, electricity and sanitation over the post Apartheid 
period .................................................................................................................................... 20 
Table 2.1: Household structure by decile ............................................................................................... 29 
Table 2.2: Average age of household head and the household by decile ............................................... 30 
Table 2.3: Labour force participation rates by decile............................................................................. 31 
Table 2.4: Labour absorption rates by decile ......................................................................................... 31 
Table 2.5: Unemployment rates by decile .............................................................................................. 32 
Table 2.6: Gini coefficients for per capita income by race and geotype ................................................ 32 
Table 2.7: Inequality decomposition by income source 1993 ................................................................ 34 
Table 2.8: Inequality decomposition by income source 2000 ................................................................ 35 
Table 2.9: Inequality Decomposition by Income Source 2008 .............................................................. 35 
Table 2.10: Poverty measures from 1993-2008 ....................................................................................... 36 
Table 2.11: Individual level poverty by race and gender (Poverty line R515 per capita per month) ...... 37 
Table 2.12: Individual level poverty by geotype (Poverty line R515 per capita per month) ................... 38 
Table 2.13: Poverty by education of household head (Poverty line R515 per capita per month) ............ 38 
Table 2.14: Individual level of poverty by household structure (Poverty line R515 per capita  
per month) ............................................................................................................................. 39 
Table 2.15: Individual level of poverty by age structure (Poverty line R515 per capita per month) ....... 39 
Table 2.16: Individual level of poverty by household labour market status (Poverty line R515 per 
capita per month) .................................................................................................................. 40 
Table 2.17: Poverty with and without government grants ....................................................................... 46 
Table 3.1: UIF revenues and expenditures ............................................................................................. 48 
Table 3.2: UIF benefits and recipient numbers ...................................................................................... 48 
Table 3.3: Previous incomes of unemployment benefit claimants, 2006 ............................................... 49 
Table 3.4: Work opportunities and budget for EPWP, 2004/05-2008/09 .............................................. 50 
Table 3.5: Wage bill for all EPWP sectors ............................................................................................ 50 
Table 3.6: Weighted number and percentage of respondents of working age that report that they  
have participated in an EPWP programme in the previous six months ................................ 51 
Table 3.7: Percentage of respondents of working age that report that they have participated in an 
EPWP programme in the previous six months, by age and gender ...................................... 52 
Table 3.8: Comparison of eligibility and self-reported receipt of the grant ........................................... 58 
Table 3.9: Percentage of households reporting grants as their main source of income, by quintile ...... 62 
Table 3.10: Percentage of households reporting any income from grants ............................................... 62 
Table 3.11: Percentage of households reporting income from social grants, by quintile ........................ 62 
Table 3.12: The poverty reduction effect of the OAP and CSG, using the lower poverty line................ 66 
Table 3.13: The poverty reduction effect of the OAP and CSG, using the higher poverty line .............. 66 
DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2010)1 
 8
Table A.2.1: Decomposition of shared household earnings .................................................................. 74 
Table A.3.1: Variables in the 2008 data ................................................................................................. 75 
Table A.3.2: Income overview ............................................................................................................... 78 
Table A.3.3: Shares of income by decile ............................................................................................... 78 
Table A.3.4: Cumulative shares of income by decile ............................................................................ 78 
Table A.3.5: Shares of income components by decile ........................................................................... 79 
Table A.3.6: Household structure by decile - no zero incomes ............................................................. 80 
Table A.3.7: Age of household head by decile - no zero incomes ......................................................... 81 
Table A.3.8: Disparity indices ............................................................................................................... 81 
Table A.3.9: Generalised entropy measures of inequality ..................................................................... 81 
Table A.3.10: Measured ........................................................................................................................... 81 
Table A.3.11: Poverty under different poverty lines using the NIDS 2008 data ..................................... 82 
 
Figures 
Figure 2.1: Kernel density of household per capita agriculture income, 1993, 2008 .......................... 24 
Figure 2.2: Overlaid kernel densities of log real household income per capita, 1993, 2000  
and 2008 ............................................................................................................................ 25 
Figure 2.3: Shares of total income by decile, 1993, 2000, 2008 ......................................................... 25 
Figure 2.4: Income components by decile, 1993 ................................................................................. 26 
Figure 2.5: Income components by decile, 2000 ................................................................................. 27 
Figure 2.6: Income components by decile, 2008 ................................................................................. 27 
Figure 2.7: CDF’s for 1993, 2000 and 2008 ....................................................................................... 41 
Figure 2.8: CDF’s across racial groups in 2008 .................................................................................. 42 
Figure 2.9: CDF’s across geotypes in 2008 ......................................................................................... 43 
Figure 2.10: Access to services ............................................................................................................. 44 
Figure 2.11: Access to assets ................................................................................................................. 44 
Figure 3.1: Educational attainment of recent EPWP participants and non-participants ...................... 52 
Figure 3.2: Average total remuneration per ........................................................................................ 53 
Figure 3.3: Expenditure items as percentage of GDP ......................................................................... 54 
Figure 3.4: Percentage of children receiving social assistance, by orphanhood status ....................... 57 
Figure 3.5: Number of children receiving Child Support Grants ........................................................ 57 
Figure 3.6: Main reason grant was not applied for .............................................................................. 59 
Figure 3.7: Main reason grant was not applied for by age .................................................................. 59 
Figure 3.8: Simulated number of eligible children under the different means tests ............................ 60 
Figure 3.9 Annual value of the State Old Age Pension in constant 2009 prices, by race .................. 61 
Figure 3.10: Sources of cash income, by quintile ................................................................................. 63 
Figure A.3.1: Overlaid Lorenz curves ..................................................................................................... 83 
Figure A.3.2: CDF’s from 1993-2008, without zero incomes ................................................................ 83 
Figure A.3.3: CDF’s from 1993-2008, without zero incomes ................................................................ 84 
Figure A.3.4: CDF’s by racial groups in 1993 ........................................................................................ 84 
Figure A.3.5: CDF’s by geotype in 2000 ................................................................................................ 85 
Figure A.3.6: CDF’s by geotype in 1993 ................................................................................................ 85 
 
Boxes 
Box 1.  A range of South African poverty lines at 2008 Rand and PPP Dollar Values ........................ 17 
 
 DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2010)1 
 9
TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICAN INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY  
SINCE THE FALL OF APARTHEID 
INTRODUCTION 
5. In addition to high poverty levels, South Africa’s inequality levels are among the highest in the 
world. Furthermore, levels of poverty and inequality continue to bear a persistent racial undertone. Two 
indicators of the post-Apartheid political economy have attracted special attention in this regard. The first 
indicator responds to the question whether the evolving character of the post-Apartheid economy and the 
policy efforts of the post-Apartheid government have been able to start to lower these very high aggregate 
levels of poverty and inequality. A related question is whether the racial footprint underlying poverty and 
inequality is starting to grey and will be replaced by new social strata and more subtle socio-economic 
dynamics. 
6. Using the latest comparable household micro data, this report attempts to address these issues by 
reviewing the development of poverty and inequality levels in South Africa since the country’s transition 
to democracy some 15 years ago. It also explores a range of social policies and their efficacy in influencing 
these outcomes. 
7. Chapter 1 provides a background for the discussion by reviewing existing empirical work on 
South African inequality and poverty. Trends since 1970 are reviewed and described in the long-run, with 
a special focus on aggregate figures and racial shares. The very name “Apartheid” indicates the importance 
of race-based geography and race-based policy. While formal policies of spatial separation by race are long 
gone, a lingering legacy remains in the rural-urban marker of inequality and poverty. In Chapter 1, we also 
present evidence on the changes in access to services and other assets over the same period, so as to 
determine whether such factors have effects on inequality and poverty that are different from those based 
on money-metric measures. The discussions are supplemented by evidence from national household survey 
data. The most important conclusion of this chapter is that intra-African inequality and poverty trends have 
increasingly dominated the aggregate measures. While between-race inequality remains high and is falling 
only slowly, it is the increase in intra-race inequality which is preventing the aggregate measures from 
declining. Therefore, policy initiatives which address the increase in intra-racial inequality are 
recommended, rather than those focused solely on redistribution between inter-racial population groups.  
8. But between-race inequality too remains a central issue. Although real incomes have been rising 
for all groups over the long run, many Africans in the country still live in poverty. At any poverty line, 
Africans are very much poorer than Coloureds, who are very much poorer than Indians/Asians, who are 
poorer than whites. Inequality by rural/urban (“geotype”) on the other hand is changing. While rural 
poverty rates remain substantially higher than those in urban areas, urban poverty rates are rising and rural 
rates seem to be falling. Finally, access to services is shown to have improved, deeming service delivery 
together with asset growth as being pro-poor.  
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9. Chapter 2 provides new empirical analyses of poverty and inequality from three comparable 
national household survey data sets from 1993, 2000 and 2008. This chapter also looks at possible drivers 
of changes in poverty and inequality patterns. Generally, the new findings in this section support those of 
the first chapter. It is found that the high level of overall income inequality has further accentuated between 
1993 and 2008, and that income has become increasingly concentrated in the top decile. Thus, the 
country’s Gini coefficient increased by four percentage points, from 0.66 to 0.70, between 1993 and 2008. 
The Gini coefficient for the African population has risen most sharply.  
10. Chapter 2 finds that poverty levels have decreased only slightly over the period under review. 
Further impeding poverty reduction is the fact that labour force participation rates increased faster than the 
share of employed in the working-age population, with a consequent increase in unemployment rates 
across all deciles. Government social assistance grants are found to be increasingly important in the 
composition of household income of low-income households. While their impact on poverty incidence 
remains negligible overall, they succeed in reducing the poverty gap, especially among the poorest 
households. That said, households without children have become relatively poorer, most often linked to a 
lack of successful integration into the labour market. The number of household heads with little or no 
schooling has fallen significantly and the number of those with upper secondary education (grades 10-12) 
has increased. This has been accompanied by a drop in the returns to an education level of less than Grade 
12. Despite the increase in educational attainment, younger age cohorts have the highest incidence and 
shares of poverty and this has not improved notably over time. The fact that better-educated young people 
remain poor suggests that the labour market has not been playing a successful role in alleviating poverty 
and that the education system is not delivering the skills needed in the labour market. Thus, it is concluded 
that it is not the labour market but rather social assistance grants which have driven the relative 
improvement in poverty levels over time.  
11. Chapter 3 analyses the role of social policies. It focuses predominantly on social assistance 
grants, but also briefly touches on unemployment insurance and the country’s Expanded Public Works 
Programme. Although the Unemployment Insurance Fund provides necessary income to those temporarily 
unemployed and previously employed, it does not offer any assistance to the jobless without previous work 
experience. As a result, the vast majority of South Africa’s unemployed are not covered by the scheme. As 
for the public works programme, the study shows that the majority of South Africans are unaware of the 
programme and only modest amounts of income are transferred to a few households via this scheme. Thus, 
the initiative does not seem to be fulfilling its stated objectives and meeting its targets of employment 
creation and poverty alleviation.  
12. Chapter 3 deals predominantly with social assistance grants, and shows that consolidated 
expenditure on welfare and social assistance has increased substantially in the post-Apartheid period. Two-
thirds of income to the bottom quintile now comes from social assistance, mainly child support grants. The 
study finds that a high number of paternal orphans receive such grants, compared to a low number of 
maternal orphans. In addition, it is found that orphans are less likely to be receiving the Child Support 
Grant than children with both parents. Most significantly, there appear to be many eligible children in need 
who are not receiving the grant. The most common reason for not applying when eligible for the grant is 
found to be a lack of correct documentation.  More than 80 percent of the elderly receive the country’s Old 
Age Pension. More than two-thirds of the recipients are women. There are three main reasons for this: 
women currently receive this benefit slightly earlier than men, they are more likely to be eligible since they 
are less likely to have private employer-based pensions, and they have a longer life expectancy. Chapter 3 
also discusses the impacts of social assistance grants on health, education and labour supply. Reviewing 
secondary sources, it is concluded that the social grants have a positive effect on school attendance rates, 
health status and nutritional outcomes.   
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13. There are many who argue that the social grant system should be extended to focus directly on 
the unemployed who remain uncovered by other grants. While economic growth has supported the 
sustainability of the growth of the grants system so far, it is questionable whether a permanent income 
support for the unemployed would lead to the desired outcomes. Many of the unemployed are young 
school leavers and while they clearly need some sort of social safety net or temporary social insurance, the 
longer term goal of policy should be directed at helping this group enter the labour market and remain in 
work in the long-term. 
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CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICAN INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY SINCE THE FALL OF APARTHEID 
14. This chapter provides the background for the rest of the report by reviewing the existing 
empirical work on South African inequality and poverty since the advent of the post-Apartheid era in 1994.  
This review highlights points of agreement and dispute within this empirical literature.   
15. South Africa has an infamous history of high inequality with an overbearing racial stamp. The 
issue of inequality has continued to dominate the post-Apartheid landscape. There are two indicators of the 
post-Apartheid political economy that have attracted special attention in this regard. The first is whether 
the evolving post-Apartheid economy and especially the policy efforts of the post-Apartheid government 
have been able to lower inherited inequality. The second is the related question of whether the blunt racial 
footprint would start to fade under more subtle post-Apartheid socio-economic dynamics. Historically the 
profiling and measurement of poverty have formed sub-themes of this inequality discussion because of the 
overt relegation of the black1 majority to the bottom of the income and wealth distributions in the country 
under Apartheid. Showing this to be the case and illuminating the poverty inducing features of Apartheid 
policies were the central tasks of much Apartheid era social science.  
16. Section 1.1 describes inequality and poverty trends in South Africa over the long-run. Census 
data provide the primary sources for such comparisons. The focus is on aggregate indicators and also on 
racial shares. In addition, the rural-urban dimension of inequality and poverty is given some attention. 
Section 1.2 augments this long-run picture by describing and summarising the evidence from national 
household survey data on post-Apartheid inequality and poverty changes. Sections 1.3 then reviews the 
decomposition exercises that have been undertaken to get underneath the description of inequality and 
poverty and to begin to explain the changes in poverty and inequality.  Section 1.4 then augments the 
money-metric focus of the previous sections by reviewing the evidence on the changes in the access to 
services and other assets in South Africa over the post-Apartheid period. The key purpose of this 
discussion is to assess whether these non money-metric dimensions of wellbeing tell a similar or different 
story to that told through the lens of income. Section 1.5 concludes. 
1.1 A long run-empirical picture of changes in inequality and poverty by race using census 
data2 
17. Few data series allow for the presentation of a long-run empirical picture of wellbeing in South 
Africa. Leibbrandt et al. (2001) derive a series of estimates of the per capita incomes of the different race 
groups since 1917 from a range of data sources. These are presented in Table 1.1. Three key points emerge 
from the two sections of the table. Looking at the top section of the table, it can be seen that average real 
incomes have been rising for all groups over the long run. This is true even of the poorest group, Africans. 
However, as shown later, even today many members of this group are still in poverty. Second, the relative 
ratios presented in the bottom section of the table show the persistence of stark average income gaps by 
race over the course of the twentieth century. The fact that these gaps pre-date Apartheid indicates that 
                                                     
1 In South Africa, “Black” refers to all groups that were classified as “non-White” under Apartheid classifications. Black 
can be further broken down into the groups African, Coloured and Asian/Indian. 
2 This section summarises a much longer discussion in Leibbrandt, Woolard and Woolard (2009). 
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they are the products of a very long-run development trajectory of the South African economy. This is 
important context to the stubborn persistence of these differences over the post-Apartheid period too.  
Table 1.1: A compilation of estimates of annual per capita personal income by race group in 2000 Rands and 
relative to White levels, 1917-2008 
Year White Coloured Asian African Average 
Per capita income in constant 2000 Rands: 
1917 13 069 2 875 2 894 1 184 3 946 
1924 13 853 2 770 2 694 1 099 4 137 
1936 19 212 3 000 4 443 1 462 5 359 
1946 26 252 4 280 6 037 2 331 7 556 
1956 30 494 5 158 6 668 2 627 8 541 
1960 31 230 4 977 5 340 2 532 8 378 
1970 45 751 7 929 9 248 3 133 11 140 
1975 49 877 9 688 12 687 4 289 12 696 
1980 48 340 9 238 12 304 4 088 11 818 
1987 45 828 9 572 13 823 3 879 10 661 
1993 46 486 8 990 19 537 5 073 11 177 
1995 48 387 9 668 23 424 6 525 12 572 
2000 56 179 12 911 23 025 8 926 16 220 
2008 75 297 16 567 51 457 9 790 17 475 
Relative per capita personal incomes (% of White level): 
1917 100 22.0 22.1 9.1 30.2 
1924 100 20.0 19.4 7.9 29.9 
1936 100 15.6 23.1 7.6 27.9 
1946 100 16.3 23.0 8.9 28.8 
1956 100 16.9 21.9 8.6 28.0 
1960 100 15.9 17.1 8.1 26.8 
1970 100 17.3 20.2 6.8 24.3 
1975 100 19.4 25.4 8.6 25.5 
1980 100 19.1 25.5 8.5 24.4 
1987 100 20.9 30.2 8.5 23.3 
1993 100 19.3 42.0 10.9 24.0 
1995 100 20.0 48.4 13.5 26.0 
2000 100 23.0 41.0 15.9 28.9 
2008 100 22.0 60.0 13.0 23.2 
Source: Leibbrandt et al. (2001) and own calculations. 
18. An important empirical tradition in tracking longer-run South African inequality and poverty 
changes has made use of records of personal income collected in the national censuses of 1970, 1991, 1996 
and 2001 (McGrath, 1983; Whiteford & McGrath, 1994; Whiteford & van Seventer, 2000; Leibbrandt et 
al., 2006; Simkins, 2005). Two important points emerge from this census-based work. First, starting in 
1970 through to 2001 inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient was very high by international 
standards; illustrating just how high the levels of inequality are that underlie the average figures presented 
in Table 1.1. Whiteford & van Seventer (2000) show that national Gini coefficients for the period 1975 to 
1996 remained close to 0.68. Leibbrandt et al. (2006) then show that this national inequality remained at 
least this high in the period 1996-2001. Second, the Gini coefficients by race show widening inequality 
within each group for each census from 1975 to 2001. From the 1991 census onwards, the Gini coefficients 
for the African and white groups are, respectively, the highest and lowest of the four race groups. 
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19. This picture of rising aggregate inequality and also rising inequality within each race group begs 
the question of the relative importance of the within-race versus the between race components of 
inequality. To address this, the South African literature has decomposed total inequality into within-group 
and between-group contributions. All of the census-based empirical work makes a consistent case that 
between-group inequality declined over the period 1975 to 1996. Clearly, the forces driving a widening 
inequality within each racial group over the last forty years have been strong enough to increase the 
overlap between the within-race distributions. Some of the declining between-group inequality is due to the 
fact that the African share of the population has increased significantly over the period. Between 1970 and 
2001 the African population share increased from 70 percent to 80 percent. This increased share was 
matched by the declining shares of the white group which fell from 17 percent of the population in 1970 to 
9 percent of the population in 2001. Clearly such demographic change gives increasing importance to the 
intra-African distribution in driving the aggregate distribution. 
20. However, there is more to these changes than shifting population shares. Whiteford & Van 
Seventer (2000) show that the income share of the African group rose much more strongly than the African 
population share over this period from a low base of 19.8 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 1991 and 36 
percent in 1996. The Coloured and the Indian/Asian shares rise too. These rising shares are matched by the 
sharply declining income share of the white group. These shares decrease from 71 percent in 1970 to 60 
percent in 1991 and 52 percent in 1996.  
21. Leibbrandt et al. (2006) found that the rapid decline in the white income share took place up only 
until 1996 and then slowed or even stopped in the period to 2001. Support for this picture emerges from an 
examination of the ratios between mean white per capita income and the mean per capita income of other 
groups from 1970 to 2001. Census data suggest that the period 1970 to 1996 saw this disparity ratio of 
African to white mean per capita incomes decrease from 15 to 9. This ratio fell for Coloured and 
Indian/Asian groups too. This is consistent with the evidence presented in Table 1.1 above. However, the 
evidence from the 2001 census suggests that this ratio did not fall further for any racial group between 
1996 and 2001. This too is consistent with the evidence presented in the last two rows of Table 1.1 above. 
Thus, the direction of these changes is not inexorable but rather is the product of actual socio-economic 
developments in the post-Apartheid period. 
22. Unfortunately, long run comparisons of poverty using census data are hard to make because the 
income bands within which incomes are reported in the censuses do not allow for a coherent set of real 
income comparisons since 1970.  Only 1996 and 2001 census data are consistent enough. Leibbrandt et al. 
(2006) go on to interrogate the full distributions of real per capita incomes in South Africa between 1996 
and 2001. The top end of the 2001 distribution lies to the right of the 1996 plot which suggests that the top 
end of the 2001 distribution contains a greater share of the population than it did in 1996. Thus, there is 
some evidence of improved real incomes at the top end. However, apart from this group at the top, the 
2001 distribution shows a leftward shift, implying decreased real incomes for the rest of the distribution. 
This is particularly pronounced in the middle and lower-middle sections of the distribution, with the 
situation at the bottom looking largely unchanged. As we have discussed above, the net effect of all of 
these changes is an unambiguous increase in inequality from 1996 to 2001. 
23. The poverty analysis follows on from the above by focussing on the changes at the bottom of 
these distributions of real per capita incomes. A lower poverty line of $2 per day (R91 per person per 
month in 1996 purchasing power parity terms) and an upper poverty line of R250 per person per month (in 
1996 Rands) are used to show that the leftward shift of incomes in the middle and lower-middle areas of 
the 2001 distribution is indeed a reflection of a slight but unambiguous increase in measured poverty 
between 1996 and 2001. 
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24. The poverty rankings by race are completely robust. At any poverty line, Africans are very much 
poorer than Coloureds, who are very much poorer than Indians/Asians, who are poorer than whites. In 
addition, measured poverty increased for Africans, coloureds and Indians/Asians between 1996 and 2001. 
However, here the choice of poverty line seems to make a difference. There were only small increases in 
poverty for Africans and coloureds when measured at the low poverty line (R91) but fairly large increases 
in poverty for these two groups and the Indian/Asian group when the higher poverty line (R250) is used. 
25. An analysis of poverty shares shows why the poverty rankings are so robust. At either poverty 
line the African share of poverty is over 95 percent in both years. The coloured poverty share accounts for 
nearly all of the remaining poverty with 1 percent of poverty or less being attributed to the other two 
groups.  
26. Leibbrandt et al. (2006) complete their discussion of income poverty by comparing rural and 
urban poverty. In both periods, rural poverty rates are substantially higher than urban poverty rates 
(regardless of the poverty line chosen). The very name Apartheid indicates the importance of race-based 
geography and race-based policy. Although formal policies of spatial separation by race are long gone, a 
lingering rural-urban legacy remains. From a policy point of view, the inheritance of a huge group of 
marginalized rural poor has greatly increased the difficulty and the costs of social delivery. However, 
poverty rates increased unambiguously in urban areas between 1992 and 2001. Moreover, while a much 
higher proportion of the rural population are poor, the proportion of the poor who are in rural areas is 
declining. Using the higher poverty line, 38 per cent of the poor were in urban areas in 1996, whereas 44 
per cent of the poor were in urban areas in 2001. This is to be expected, given that a significant amount of 
rural to urban migration occurred over the period.  
1.2 Evidence about post-Apartheid inequality and poverty trends from national household 
survey data 
27. In order to give a longer-run perspective on changes in inequality and poverty, the previous 
section made use of census data going back to 1970. While aggregate descriptions of poverty and 
inequality provide important context, they do little more than hint at the forces driving socio-economic 
development and the complex relationship between poverty and inequality. Even under high Apartheid 
with job reservation explicitly widening racial inequality by rationing high-skill and high wage jobs to 
whites and low wage and low skill jobs to non-whites, in periods of strong economic growth there was 
dissent about whether this unequal growth path was improving or worsening poverty (Seekings & Nattrass 
(2005). Two key mechanisms were at issue and still continue to dominate debates over the relationship 
between inequality and poverty. The first is the employment and remuneration behaviour of the labour 
market. Strong positive employment and real wage responses to economic growth are the major poverty 
alleviating mechanisms of the private sector economy. The second mechanism is the fiscal resources that 
growth puts in the hands of the state for active social policy and poverty alleviation. 
28. Since 1993, researchers have been able to access information from a number of national sample 
surveys and have used these to complement census-based analyses and to provide alternative estimates of 
inequality and poverty. The result is a substantial literature which is very useful in updating the census-
based picture to the present.  There has been some debate in this literature over the magnitudes of 
measured inequality and poverty implied by the different surveys and even over whether poverty has 
increased or decreased over the post-Apartheid period.  
29. The inequality picture can be quickly dealt with as all of this work (Simkins, 2005; Fedderke et 
al., 2003; Hoogeveen & Özler, 2006; van der Berg et al., 2006; van der Berg et al., 2008) supports the 
picture coming out of the census data; namely that both aggregate inequality and inequality within each 
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race group has continued to increase through the 1990s and into the 2000s. Van der Berg and Louw (2004) 
summarise this corpus as follows:  
Rising black per capita incomes over the past three decades have narrowed the inter-
racial income gap, although increasing inequality within the black population seems to 
have prevented a significant decline in aggregate inequality …. (p. 568-9). 
30. The inequality analysis of chapter 2 interrogates this picture more carefully by producing a 
consistent set of inequality estimates using national survey data sets from 1993, 2000 and 20083. For now, 
Table 1.2 presents a set of South African Gini coefficients based on expenditure data from the 2004 
General Household Survey. They show that South African inequality remains very high by international 
standards. The results also confirm that the greatest inequality is within the African population and lowest 
within the White population. The table holds a useful caution. The actual magnitudes of the inequality 
measures that come from household sample surveys are much lower than the census estimates presented in 
the previous section of this paper and it is inequality measures such as these expenditure based estimates 
that are used in order to compare South African inequality in the post 2000 period to other countries. 
Table 1.2: Gini coefficients by race and location, 2004 
  African Coloured Indian/Asian White Total 
Rural 0.43 0.38 - 0.37 0.51 
Urban 0.53 0.45 0.43 0.36 0.56 
Overall 0.51 0.47 0.43 0.36 0.59 
Source: Own calculations on 2004 General Household Survey, Statistics South Africa. 
                                                     
3 Annex I provides a summary description of the micro data used in the remainder of this end subsequent chapters. 
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Box 1.  A range of South African poverty lines at 2008 Rand and PPP Dollar Values 
In reviewing the poverty literature, one is confronted by a bewildering array of poverty lines. For orientation, the 
table below introduces a range of per capita monthly poverty lines at their 2008 South African values. It also records 
them at their purchasing power parity dollar values using a parity exchange rate of 4.25 rands to the dollar. The year is 
selected because all of the poverty analysis in chapter 2 is undertaken using poverty lines calculated at real 2008 
values. The two major poverty lines that are used in the analysis of chapter 2 are two absolute poverty lines called 
South African Upper and Lower in the table. Then a range of dollar a day lines are presented at their rand per capita 
per month values. Finally, two median related relative poverty lines that are in common usage in the OECD literature 
(OECD, 2008) are presented. It is noteworthy that due to the skewed distribution of income, these median lines are 
lower than the $2/day line. 
A range of South African monthly poverty lines at 2008 Rand and PPP Dollar values 
Poverty Line 
2008 
Rand Values 
2008 Purchasing Power 
Parity Dollar Values 
South African Upper 949 223 
South African Lower 515 121 
$1/day 130 31 
$1.25/day 163 38 
$2/day 260 62 
$2.5/day 325 76 
50% Median per capita income 233 55 
40% Median per capita income 154 36 
Source: Own calculations on 2008 National Income Dynamics Survey 
31. The poverty trends are more contentious than the inequality trends.  It is useful to structure the 
discussion around two sub-periods; 1994 to 2000 and then the post-2000 period.  Regarding the first sub-
period a series of studies have found evidence for an increase in poverty over this time. Statistics South 
Africa (2002) and Hoogeveen & Özler (2006) found that poverty increased between 1995 and 2000. 
Hoogeveen  & Özler (2006) estimate that 12.6 million South Africans were living on less than PPP$1 per 
day in 1995 compared to 14.4 million in 2000 and that 22.9 million South Africans were living on less than 
PPP$2 per day in 1995 rising to 25.2m in 2000. The direction of these findings accords with the census 
based analysis presented earlier. However, the measured increase in poverty is more acute than that found 
using the Census. Simkins (2005) performed analysis on the 1995 and 2000 IES surveys as well as the 
1996 and 2001 censuses. Using a poverty line set at household income of R800 per household per month, 
he finds that poverty worsened slightly over the period, rising from 29% in 1995 to 34% in 2000.  
32. On the other hand, the UNDP (2004), Van der Berg & Louw (2004) and Van der Berg et al. 
(2006) find that poverty stabilized or declined over this period. However none of this work argues for a 
notable improvement in poverty over this sub-period. UNDP reports that while the extent of poverty 
appears to have declined slightly, the depth of poverty (measured by the poverty gap) increased, 
particularly when using lower poverty lines. Van der Berg & Louw (2004) note that current household 
income as seen in the national accounts rose over the sub-period and that this is inconsistent with the 
decline in household incomes observed by using the IES 1995 and 2000 survey data. After adjustments to 
mean incomes for each race group in line with the national accounts and other sources of data, they find 
that the poverty headcount ratio stabilised or even declined slightly between 1995 and 2000, although the 
number of people living in poverty increased due to population growth.  
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33. Van der Berg et al. (2006) use the same technique with the All Media and Products Survey 
(AMPS) data in order to extend their analysis to 2004. As shown in Table 1.3 they find that the poverty 
rate rose between 1993 and 2000 and then fell quite dramatically between 2000 and 2004. They estimate 
that there were 18.5 million poor in 2000 and this fell to 15.4 million in 2004. Van der Berg et al. (2008) 
repeat this exercise at the R250 per capita per month poverty line. They confirm the same trends with 
poverty headcount ratios for 1993, 1995, 2000 and 2004 being 50.1%, 51.7%, 50.8% and 46.9% 
respectively.  In addition per capita real incomes of individuals in the poorest two quintiles rose by more 
than 30 per cent during 2000-2004. While the magnitude of this rise may be debatable, it should be borne 
in mind that this period coincides with a large increase in social grants. Van der Berg et al. (2006) point 
out that the total income received by the poorest two quintiles in 2000 amounted to R27 billion and that 
government subsequently increased its annual social grant payment bill by R22 billion (in constant 2000 
Rand terms). Most of these grant payments would have been received by individuals in the bottom two 
quintiles of the income distribution which provides a strong expectation of some improvement in the 
incomes of the poor. 
Table 1.3: Selected indicators of poverty, assuming poverty line of R3000 per capita per year (in constant 2000 
prices) 
 1993 2000 2004 
Average per capita income in quintile 1 R855 R866 R1 185 
Average per capita income in quintile 2 R2 162 R2 086 R2 770 
% of population that is poor 40.6 41.3 33.2 
Number of poor (million) 16.2 18.5 15.4 
Source: Van der Berg et al. (2006). 
34. The methodology and therefore the findings of the papers by van der Berg and co-authors are 
contentious. Meth (2006 and 2007) has been most strident in arguing against the methodology and has 
derived an alternative set of post-2000 poverty estimates using an income variable constructed from the 
information in the 2004 General Household Survey and the Labour Force Survey. Despite his opposition, 
his work supports a finding that the poverty rate declined between 2000 and 2004 and that this was driven 
by social grant payments. However, his estimates place 18 to 20 million South Africans in poverty in 2004. 
This is a much smaller decline and a less clear sign of success for anti-poverty policies in the post-
Apartheid era than that shown by van der Berg and co-authors. 
35. In sum, there is something of a consensus around the direction of post-Apartheid inequality and 
poverty trends even if there are disagreements about the precise levels at any point in time. Aggregate 
inequality has remained stubbornly high and perhaps even increased. This is being driven by increasing 
intra-race inequality. In the adjustments to South African society accompanying the advent of democracy, 
such dynamism is not unexpected and not necessarily bad. However, the fact that the post-Apartheid 
society started off with such a high level of inequality certainly adds an ominous note to this trend. Given 
the skewed distribution of human and physical assets that undergirds these trends, it is unsurprising that 
there has not been a dramatic improvement in money-metric poverty over the early years of the post-
Apartheid period. More recent years have witnessed stronger gains against poverty. Indeed, one of the 
useful features of the interchange between Meth and Van der Berg et al. is that it has highlighted the 
importance of the social grant system as a social safety net in South Africa. The importance of the state old 
age pension has been recognized from the outset of the post-Apartheid period and the demonstrable impact 
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of the child support grant in the last six years is notable. This takes the aggregate empirical picture a little 
closer to the real application of post-Apartheid policy in South Africa.  
36. However, there is very little literature that has attempted to show this formally or, more generally 
to move beyond description to attempt to explain changes in poverty and inequality over the post-
Apartheid period. The next section of this chapter briefly reviews the decomposition exercises that have 
been done in this regard.  
1.3 Explaining Changes in Post-Apartheid Inequality 
37. The dominant decomposition exercise that has been undertaken on post-Apartheid national 
survey data follow Shorrocks (1984) in partitioning aggregate income inequality (as measured by the Gini 
coefficient) into contributions from various income sources (Leibbrandt et al., 2000, Bhorat et al. 2000, 
Leibbrandt et al. 2009). Such exercises are important in formally establishing the importance of the labour 
market and social grants in understanding South African inequality. In the next chapter, we undertake such 
income source decompositions exercises using consistent data for 1993, 2000 and 2008 in order to compare 
the results over time. Thus, we will be brief here.  
38. In the South African context it makes sense to decompose income into four sources; namely, 
remittances, wage income (including self-employment), social assistance (“grants”) and capital income 
(such as dividends, interest, rent income, imputed rent from residing in own dwelling and private 
pensions). All of the decomposition analyses find that wage income (including self-employment income) 
has a dominant share of income (around 70%) but makes an even larger contribution to inequality (around 
85%).  The reason for this is the high correlation between wage income and total household income (a rank 
correlation of over 0.9), implying that a household's rank in the distribution of wage income is strongly 
correlated with that households rank in the distribution of total income. All in all, the labour market is 
shown to sit centre-stage as the driver of South African income inequality.  
39. A useful extension to this decomposition, derived by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1994), has been 
applied in South Africa. This extension allows the inequality contribution of wage income (or any income 
source) to be further decomposed into a contribution due to inequality among those earning income from 
that source and the proportion of households who have no access to a particular income source.  Thus, this 
takes the analysis part of the way to apportioning the "blame" for Gini inequality into two parts; the 
inequality amongst earners and the inequality driven by those with some wage income and those with 
none.  From such exercises it appears that at least one-third of dominant contribution of "wage inequality" 
is attributable to the large percentage of households with zero wage income.  Thus, low labour force 
participation and lack of access to employment are an important component of the dominance of the labour 
market in driving South African inequality. 
40. In contrast to wages, state transfers are shown to account for up to 10% of income but to make 
almost no contribution to inequality. This very low contribution arises because of the low correlation 
between the rank ordering of transfer income as well as the low Gini coefficient for state transfers. In 1993 
and even more so by 2000, state transfers were heavily concentrated in the middle of the distribution as 
access to a State Old Age Pension or Disability Grant was sufficient to lift most households out of the 
bottom quintile, while the means tests for these grants excluded households at the upper end of the income 
distribution. This is a promising outcome in that it seems to suggest that such transfers make a significant 
contribution and are well targeted. 
41. In order to better understand the mechanism whereby employment affects inequality, Leibbrandt 
et al. (2009) make use of a second decomposition technique which breaks the log-variance of household 
labour market earnings per capita into these three components: 
DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2010)1 
 20
wp
wp
L
W
L
L
hhsize
L
hhsize
W ••=  
where W is labour market income from both wage and self-employment (for simplicity we call it 
merely ‘wage income’), hhsize is household size, Lp is the potential number of workers (defined here as the 
number of persons aged 15-64) and LW  is the number of people actually employed. 
42. As detailed in annex II, taking the natural logarithm of both sides of the equation above and 
calculating the variance gives one a decomposition for the log variance of labour market income per capita 
into the sum of the log variance of the three terms on the right hand side of the above expression plus three 
covariance terms. The contribution of each of the three log variance terms can be thought of as the 
contribution of household composition (the number of persons of working age), access to employment and 
wage inequality, respectively to the inequality of shared household earnings. Table A.1.5 in the annex II 
reveals that most of the inequality in shared household earnings is the result of unequal wage incomes, 
rather than the fraction of household members that are of working age or who are actually working. 
Nevertheless, joblessness has a significant effect on household wage inequality. This is particularly true in 
African households. While this decomposition tackles the issue from a different perspective to that of the 
income source decomposition above, the results support a general conclusion of high wage inequality 
being a product of a considerable wage dispersion coupled with unequal access to employment 
opportunities. 
1.4 Alternatives to the money-metric picture 
43. There is a sense in which the inequality and poverty review in this chapter up to this point has 
been unfair to the mechanisms and achievements of post-Apartheid policy. We have focussed on money 
metric poverty and inequality and largely ignored a literature (Leibbrandt et al., 2006; Bhorat et al., 2006; 
and Woolard & Woolard, 2007) showing substantial improvements in access to services such as housing, 
water and electricity over the post Apartheid period. For example, Leibbrandt et al 2006 use census data 
from the 1996 and 2001 to show that access to type of dwelling, water, energy for lighting, energy for 
cooking, sanitation and refuse removal all improved significantly over this period. The proportion of 
households occupying traditional dwellings has decreased while the proportion of households occupying 
formal dwellings has risen slightly (approximately two-thirds of households occupy formal dwellings). 
Access to all basic services has improved, especially with regard to access to electricity for lighting and 
access to telephones.  
44. Table 1.4 below shows another example from Bhorat et al. (2006). This study uses household 
survey data from 1993, 1999 and 2004 and, as can be seen in the table, it shows that access to basic 
services increased from 1993 to 1999 to 2004 and also that the growth in services was stronger for the 
poorer quintiles. In this sense they argue that the increase in services has been pro-poor. 
Table 1.4: Changes in access to housing, water, electricity and sanitation over the post Apartheid period 
 Formal 
Dwelling 
Piped Water Electricity for 
Lighting 
Electricity for 
Cooking 
Flush/Chemical 
Toilets 
1993 68.3% 59.3% 51.9% 45.2% 52.6% 
1999 74.2% 65.7% 69.5% 52.7% 55.5% 
2004 73.6% 67.8% 80.2% 59.4% 57.2% 
Source: Bhorat et al. (2006), own calculations. 
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45. Aside from this literature on access to services, there is also a literature looking at assets and 
asset indices.  For the purposes of this review, Bhorat et al. (2006) is the most useful of these studies. This 
study pools asset data from the 1993 SALDRU survey, the 1999 October Household Survey and the 2004 
General Household Survey and uses factor analysis to derive a single cross-survey asset index. This assets 
used in the derivation of the index include all of the services listed in table 1.4 above (public assets) and 
then telephones, motor vehicles and televisions (private assets). This enables the authors to make robust 
comparisons of asset well-being over time. They apply conventional poverty and inequality measures to 
this asset index to show that asset poverty and inequality declined from 1993 to 1999 and then to 2004. 
Given this, it is not surprising that they are able to define the asset growth over this period as being pro-
poor. 
46. Collectively then, this literature on changes in access to services and assets provides a more 
positive situation than the one that comes out of the preceding review of changes to money-metric well-
being. 
1.5 Conclusion 
47. This chapter began by showing that the long-run development trajectory in South Africa 
generated a society defined by very high inequality with a strong racial component. Historically this was 
the result of direct racial privileging in state policy; spanning direct racial interventions in the labour 
market as well as racial biases in determining where people were allowed to live and in education, health 
and social services expenditures. The intersections between these policies and a growing private sector 
economy serve as a prototypical model of inequality-perpetuating growth. Unfortunately such spatial and 
human capital inequities leave very long-run legacies and these processes are hard to reverse. 
48. Clearly, 15 years of post-Apartheid transition has not been not enough time for these factors to 
work their ways out of South African society. South Africa’s high aggregate inequality has not fallen. 
Indeed, going into the future, South Africa’s socio-economic dynamics still contain considerable inequality 
generating momentum despite a post-Apartheid policy milieu that has explicitly taken on the task of 
addressing this legacy.  A demographic trend that will have a bearing on these dynamics going into the 
future is the fact that the African group accounts for 80% of the population now and this share is rising. 
Thus, intra-African inequality and poverty trends are already and will increasingly dominate aggregate 
inequality and poverty trends. This is not to say that the country’s racial footprint has gone. Indeed, we 
showed earlier that the between-race component of income inequality remains remarkably high by 
international norms and its decline has slowed since the mid 1990s. Moreover, the bottom deciles of the 
income distribution and the poverty profile are still dominated by Africans and racial income shares are far 
from proportionate with population shares. Nonetheless, South Africa’s changing population shares imply 
that a policy focus on race-based redistribution will become increasingly limited in the future as the 
foundation for further broad-based social development. Rather, it would seem that a more dynamically 
sustainable direction lies in addressing seriously the increasing inequality within each race group.  
49. In Chapter 3 we come back to these policy issues by taking a closer look at social assistance 
grants and the state’s social policy.  However, before we proceed to this discussion of social spending, 
Chapter 2 interrogates and adds to the review of post-Apartheid inequality and poverty of this first chapter 
by comparing the empirical picture of poverty and inequality from three national household survey data 
sets from 1993, 2000 and 2008. Careful attention is given to making these data sets as consistent as 
possible. 
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CHAPTER 2: AN EMPIRICAL DESCRIPTION OF INEQUALITY AND POVERTY OVER THE 
POST-APARTHEID PERIOD 
50. This chapter examines the evolution of inequality and poverty in South Africa over the period 
1993 to 2008, using comparable and latest available household micro data.  The focus of the chapter is on 
measuring the patterns and extent of changes over this 15 year period.  We use data from the Project for 
Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD) for 1993; the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and 
Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) for 2000; and the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) for 
2008.  It also looks at possible drivers for changes in poverty and inequality patterns. 
2.1 Data and Methods 
51. When attempting to compare changes over time through the lens of separate cross-sectional 
datasets, there are obviously going to be differences in methodology that at least partially confound 
comparison.  This section analyses the various sources of bias that may be found in the content of this 
report by virtue of this problem. We focus specifically on the differences in measurement of income, which 
is the variable upon which the analysis of poverty and inequality rests.   
52. There are many minor differences in measurement methodology across the three sources of data.  
While some of these have only a small impact, others are more serious sources of bias.  Some of the more 
influential problems with comparison of the income aggregates are discussed below.  A complete table 
listing all of the variables included in the income aggregates is available in the annex III (Table A.3.1) of 
this report.  Inspection of these tables (and the actual questionnaires to which they are linked) shows 
clearly the extent to which these instruments differ, particularly the IES/LFS from the other two.   
53. All of the income variables in the 2000 data are annual, whereas the 1993 and 2008 data focus 
mostly on the last 30 days. The latter methodology aims to mitigate recall bias at the expense of creating 
some lumpiness, due to incomes that are received over longer time periods than months (e.g. a remittance 
payment that is received every 2 months).  It is difficult to tell exactly what effect this will have.  In 1993 
and 2008, questions on remittances were asked in both annual and monthly format.  Comparing the results 
of these two, we get substantially lower estimates from the annual figures (converted to monthly), which 
tells us that at least in some cases it makes a difference.  This particular example is also relevant because 
the 1993 income aggregates used the annual estimate whereas the 2008 made use of the monthly.   
54. The differences between the questions used to measure income in 1993 and 2008 are much 
smaller than those between these instruments and that of 2000. However, there is one major 
methodological disparity between the 1993 and 2008 instruments. In 1993, one respondent answered a 
survey for the entire household4.  In contrast, the 2008 survey had questionnaires for all of the members of 
the household.  Clearly the 2008 data will be less prone to measurement error on income.  This is 
particularly problematic because it is not entirely clear how the bias from this type of questioning will be 
manifested in the data.   
                                                     
4 Individual level income questions were asked, but one person in the household provided all of this information for the 
rest. 
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55. Differences in the treatment of implied rental income have the potential to distort comparisons 
over time. People who do not pay rent for the homes they inhabit nevertheless derive some of their welfare 
from living in these dwellings.  Implied rental income aims to measure this flow of welfare so that income 
figures do not understate the income of people who own their own homes.  Unfortunately implied rental 
income is excluded from the income figures for all three datasets.  The 2000 data does not include any 
values from which implied rentals can be calculated or imputed, so it is impossible to compare this data to 
the other two without excluding it.  The 1993 dataset does include an implied rental income figure which is 
calculated from house prices, and which can be improved with some careful imputation. The 1993 data 
applied a set rate of return which is problematic in the tails of the distribution where there are likely to be 
non-linearities in the relationship.  The 2008 implied rental income data, in contrast, is far more nuanced, 
based on several variables that attempt to measure the opportunity cost of living in their homes.   
56. The distributions of the implied rental income variables from the two datasets are very different 
and their inclusion for the purposes of comparison is likely to create large differences driven by 
measurement error rather than real changes. This is not ideal because the housing market in South Africa 
has experienced substantial growth over the past 15 years and we are excluding this from the analysis.  In 
defence of this move, it is not clear that the massive changes in housing prices really reflect a growth in 
welfare of the inhabitants to the same extent. It is quite possible that even if we had comparable data for all 
three points in time we would have to exclude implied rentals due to the distortionary effect they may have 
on our figures.  
57. Another potential source of distortions in comparisons over time is differences in the 
measurement of agricultural income. Agricultural income has been excluded from the household income 
figures for the purpose of this analysis due to problems in comparability. While agricultural production 
data was collected in 2000, the monetary value of this income is not available.  Between 2008 and 1993 
there are some significant differences in the measurement of agricultural income, which complicates 
comparison. Below we give some brief descriptive information about the differences in the agricultural 
income data from 1993 and 2008, as they do have some ramifications for our overall results.   
58. The 1993 agriculture data have a few very high values which clearly belong to commercial 
farmers.  Commercial farmers were excluded from the module on agricultural income in the 2008 survey. 
The result is that the mean per capita household agricultural income in 1993 is very much inflated and not 
comparable to the mean from 2008. The median (which is much less affected by these outliers) per capita 
household agriculture (among those who received agricultural income) in 1993 was measured at around 
R14 compared to 2008 at about R2 (both in 2008 Rands). Figure 2.1 below shows the differences in 
distribution between the two datasets.   
59. Including agricultural income in the 2008 data has almost no impact on poverty counts at all.  In 
contrast, in 1993, poverty incidence rates fall by around 1% when agricultural income is included.  So 
certainly the exclusion of this from both datasets does result in a slightly overstated decline in poverty over 
the period.  
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Figure 2.1: Kernel density of household per capita agriculture income, 1993, 2008 
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2.2 Trends in Inequality 
60. The purpose of this section of the report is to provide an overview of how the distribution of 
income in South Africa changed between 1993 and 2008. Broad measures of income distribution will be 
complemented by a close look at the role of the labour market in determining income and inequality in the 
country. The income variable in all cases refers to household income per capita and is given in real terms 
with 2008 as the base year. The income variable is the sum of all labour market earnings, remittances 
received, income of a capital nature, government grants and all “other” income. As discussed above, 
imputed rent and income from subsistence agriculture have been omitted in order to make the 1993 and 
2008 data closely comparable with that of 2000. 
61. Starting with some central tendencies, the overall mean figures for real household income per 
capita have trended upwards over the fifteen years and stand at R1 147, R1 349 and R1 456 for 1993, 2000 
and 2008 respectively. The comparative real medians are R419, R453 and R450. Table A.3.2 in the annex 
III shows how deeply the racial income disparities run in South Africa with African mean per capita 
incomes rising from R539 in 1993 to R816 in 2008 compared to the comparative figures for Whites which 
stand at R4 632 and R6 275. The income share divided by the population share for Africans increased 
marginally over the 15 years from 0.47 to 0.56. There were small increases in this ratio for the White and 
Coloured population as well, and a large increase for Asians/Indians. 
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Figure 2.2: Overlaid kernel densities of log real household income per capita, 1993, 2000 and 2008 
 
62. Figure 2.2, above, is a representation of the income distributions across the three years of 
analysis. The most striking feature of the figure is the fact that there has been very little shifting in the 
overall distribution of income. There has been some rightward movement at the lower and upper extremes 
of the distributions between 1993 and 2008, but the kernel densities are very similar overall. 
Figure 2.3: Shares of total income by decile, 1993, 2000, 2008 
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63. Figure 2.3, above, shows that income has become increasingly concentrated in the top decile. 
Across the three years the richest 10% accounted for 54%, 57% and 58% of total income respectively (see 
annex III, Table A.3.3). Detailed interrogation of ventile shares shows that the increase in the top decile 
has been driven by a sharply rising share of the top 5% of the distribution. This share increased from 
38.2% to 41.1% to 42.6% across the three years. These increased shares at the top end of the distribution 
came at the expense of all other income deciles. The cumulative share of income accruing to the first five 
deciles decreased from 8.32% in 1993 to 7.79% in 2008 (see annex III, Table A.3.4). 
64. Figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 below illustrate the changing importance of the different components of 
income from 1993 to 2008.5 As expected, earnings from the labour market make up the bulk of total 
income for the higher deciles, while the contribution of government grants is particularly important for 
poor households. It is interesting to note the growing contribution of government grants to these 
households – for the bottom decile the figures grow from 15% to 29% to 73% and this reflects the 
increasing number of state grants that were rolled out over the 15 years, especially in the latest period. The 
contribution of remittances to total income has steadily decreased for the lower deciles and has been 
replaced by an increasing share of government grants. Income generated from household capital is small 
for all except the top decile where its contribution rose from 4% in 1993 to 11% in 2008.  
Figure 2.4: Income components by decile, 1993 
 
                                                     
5 Table A.2.22 in the annex III  presents full percentages for the income components.  
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Figure 2.5: Income components by decile, 2000 
 
Figure 2.6: Income components by decile, 2008 
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65. Table 2.1 shows trends in household structure by decile.6 The percentage of single adult 
households is highest at the extreme ends of the income spectrum.  While the number in the bottom decile 
is inflated by the zero incomes, the same basic trend is observed in the tables where zeroes are excluded.  It 
makes some sense that many of the wealthiest households are in fact single professionals living alone.  
This would explain a fairly high proportion of wealthy households being single adult households.  It also 
makes sense that single parents are likely to be poorer, as they have to support a family on a single income. 
The fact that poorer households experience higher rates of mortality also means that people that are poor 
already are more likely to experience the loss of an adult.  So the shock of becoming a single parent could 
be a cause of poverty, but being poor makes this more likely.  It is clear from examples such as these that 
understanding the role of changes in household structure on welfare is confounded by the difficulty of 
discerning between correlation and causation.  It is unclear which way causation runs in these types of 
comparisons.  Being a single adult household is not in itself a clear predictor of affluence or poverty.   
66. The trend in child presence across deciles is much clearer. The percentage of households in the 
upper deciles having no children is much higher than in the lower deciles. The slight uptick in percentage 
of childless households in the bottom decile is once again exaggerated by the presence of zeroes, but still 
exists in more muted form without them. One could speculate that this may be due to the poorest of the 
poor being unable to afford children. Differences in child presence are certainly caused in part by different 
strategies among the rich and poor. However there is also an obvious effect of reproductive choices on 
economic status.   
67. The patterns of worker attachment against income deciles are clearly illustrated across all three 
waves in the way we would a priori expect. The proportion of households with multiple workers attached 
to them increases almost monotonically up the income deciles. A similar pattern is observed in the 
proportion of single worker households, except this proportion drops off slightly in the very top decile.   
                                                     
6 Because of the inclusion of many zero income households where it is unclear whether these are true zeros or results of 
the measurement process, we check all of our conclusions against tables that exclude the zero incomes.  These results 
are presented in Table A.2.23 in the annex III.   
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Table 2.1: Household structure by decile 
2008 
  Number of adults  Children present  Number of workers 
Decile  Single Two+  None One+  None One Two+ 
1  44% 56% 30% 70% 80% 17% 3% 
2  32% 68% 11% 89% 57% 35% 8% 
3  28% 72% 19% 81% 53% 33% 13% 
4  24% 76% 20% 80% 42% 45% 13% 
5  20% 80% 22% 78% 40% 45% 15% 
6  26% 74% 35% 65% 36% 44% 20% 
7  33% 67% 52% 48% 30% 45% 24% 
8  36% 64% 55% 45% 12% 62% 26% 
9  39% 61% 61% 39% 12% 60% 28% 
10  41% 59% 68% 32% 10% 57% 33% 
Overall 34% 66% 43% 57% 32% 47% 21% 
2000 
  Number of adults  Children present  Number of workers 
Decile  Single Two+  None One+  None One Two+ 
1  29% 71% 24% 76% 50% 33% 17% 
2  21% 79% 13% 87% 49% 36% 15% 
3  21% 79% 15% 85% 47% 35% 18% 
4  23% 77% 18% 82% 41% 40% 19% 
5  24% 76% 26% 74% 37% 41% 22% 
6  25% 75% 34% 66% 26% 50% 25% 
7  35% 65% 47% 53% 27% 50% 24% 
8  33% 67% 52% 48% 16% 56% 28% 
9  38% 62% 58% 42% 12% 57% 31% 
10  36% 64% 65% 35% 9% 48% 43% 
Overall 30% 70% 41% 59% 27% 47% 27% 
1993 
  Number of adults  Children present  Number of workers 
Decile  Single Two+  None One+  None One Two+ 
1  25% 75% 21% 79% 72% 22% 6% 
2  19% 81% 6% 94% 58% 33% 9% 
3  15% 85% 7% 93% 50% 34% 15% 
4  16% 84% 10% 90% 40% 42% 18% 
5  17% 83% 16% 84% 35% 44% 22% 
6  16% 84% 21% 79% 24% 47% 28% 
7  19% 81% 30% 70% 17% 53% 30% 
8  25% 75% 43% 57% 12% 53% 34% 
9  35% 65% 56% 44% 5% 57% 37% 
10  30% 70% 69% 31% 8% 42% 51% 
Overall 24% 76% 35% 65% 26% 45% 29% 
Source: Own calculations using data from SALDRU 1993, IES 2000 and NIDS 2008 data sets 
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68. This leaves no-worker households, which decrease as a proportion of households as we move up 
the deciles.  The relative dominance of single worker households remains across all three datasets with 
approximately 44% and 47% of households in this category.    
69. While the patterns are the same across all three datasets, the levels are not. The data suggest that 
there has been a dramatic increase in single adult households over the last 15 years from 23% in 1993 up to 
33% in 2008 (from 30% in 2000). Coupled with this is a large increase in childless households from 35% 
to 41% to 43% across 1993, 2000 and 2008 respectively. There has also been a steady decline in multiple 
worker households, a slight decline in single worker households and a large increase in workerless 
households.  The distribution of these three changed from (29%, 45%, 26%) in 1993 to (32%, 47%, 21%) 
in 2008. While many forces are involved in driving demographic changes of these types (AIDS for 
example must have a significant impact), it seems unlikely that these changes are unrelated to the evolution 
of poverty and inequality over this 15 year period.  
Table 2.2: Average age of household head and the household by decile 
 1993  2000  2008 
Decile Mean Age 
(Head) 
Mean Age 
(All) 
 Mean Age 
(Head) 
Mean Age 
(All) 
 Mean Age 
(Head) 
Mean Age 
(All) 
1 47.5 21.2  44.4 20.8  41.8 21.6 
2 50.9 20.7  48.8 21.5  44.9 20.4 
3 52.0 22.1  48.4 22.5  48.4 22.7 
4 51.6 23.4  48.7 23.9  48.8 24.6 
5 50.8 24.9  47.7 24.4  47.6 25.1 
6 50.1 25.9  45.3 25.2  46.3 27.7 
7 47.8 26.8  45.2 27.0  48.4 31.2 
8 45.7 28.0  42.8 27.5  41.1 28.7 
9 41.9 29.7  42.6 29.5  41.3 30.2 
10 43.0 33.4  43.3 32.3  44.8 34.7 
Overall 47.0 25.6  45.1 25.4  45.1 26.7 
Source: Own calculations using data from SALDRU 1993, IES 2000 and NIDS 2008 data sets 
70. Table 2.2 shows the mean age of the household head and all members of households across 
deciles for the three datasets. Over the 15 year period the mean age of the household head has declined by 
approximately 2 years.  The decline in age of household heads is stronger for the households of the lower 
deciles. The lowest deciles experienced mean drops of up to 5 years. The top decile in contrast experienced 
mean increases, although the median still declined, suggesting that the distribution has become more 
skewed to the right, for these deciles.7  In contrast to this picture of the age of the household head, the 
figures on the mean age of the household as a whole make it clear that households in the bottom three 
deciles are younger on average than other deciles. The average age of households in these bottom deciles 
did not decline over time and even increased marginally. Within all deciles the average age did not change 
markedly over time. 
                                                     
7 The same table, excluding households with zero incomes, can be found in the annex III (table A.2.24) but reflects no 
major differences from the table above.  
 DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2010)1 
 31
71. Overall, this table does not suggest major changes to the age structure across time and across 
deciles. The bottom deciles remain younger and their heads have become younger over time. 
Table 2.3: Labour force participation rates by decile 
Decile 1993 2000 2008 
1 23.7% 46.3% 37.5% 
2 23.5% 44.1% 39.4% 
3 28.4% 44.8% 47.9% 
4 33.7% 49.4% 50.7% 
5 39.3% 51.2% 48.4% 
6 47.6% 58.5% 59.6% 
7 51.6% 61.3% 64.3% 
8 59.8% 68.0% 75.1% 
9 70.6% 71.5% 77.4% 
10 80.4% 77.6% 81.1% 
Overall 48.9% 58.7% 59.7% 
Source: Own calculations using data from SALDRU 1993, IES 2000 and NIDS 2008 data sets 
72. In Table 2.3, above, the labour force participation rates by decile show a generally increasing 
trend for all deciles from 1993 to 2008. Amongst some of the low income deciles there is a peak in the rate 
of labour force participation in 2000 followed by a drop-off in 2008. As expected, the top income deciles 
display the highest rates of labour force participation, reaching over three quarters for deciles eight, nine 
and ten in 2008. 
Table 2.4: Labour absorption rates by decile 
Decile 1993 2000 2008 
1 11.8% 25.7% 10.2% 
2 14.9% 24.2% 18.5% 
3 20.3% 25.9% 21.3% 
4 25.5% 29.5% 26.2% 
5 29.5% 33.2% 25.6% 
6 37.6% 39.2% 34.6% 
7 43.2% 44.9% 41.5% 
8 52.9% 53.8% 50.5% 
9 65.9% 62.5% 58.6% 
10 78.2% 74.3% 63.2% 
Overall 41.1% 43.3% 37.2% 
Source: Own calculations using data from SALDRU 1993, IES 2000 and NIDS 2008 data sets 
73. Table 2.4 shows that the labour absorption rate (the percentage of the working age population 
who are employed) has trended differently for different deciles. Amongst the poorest 10%, the labour 
absorption rate peaked at about 25% in 2000 before falling to just above 10% in 2008. The top decile had a 
labour absorption rate that peaked at 78% in 1993 before falling to 63% in 2008. 
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Table 2.5: Unemployment rates by decile 
Decile 1993 2000 2008 
1 49.1% 44.17% 69.4% 
2 33.6% 44.24% 46.0% 
3 26.8% 41.32% 46.7% 
4 22.0% 39.21% 36.9% 
5 23.4% 34.39% 30.3% 
6 18.7% 32.55% 26.1% 
7 14.5% 26.30% 20.1% 
8 9.4% 20.67% 16.4% 
9 4.3% 12.53% 9.0% 
10 1.5% 4.11% 4.5% 
Overall 13.7% 25.7% 24.4% 
Source: Own calculations using data from SALDRU 1993, IES 2000 and NIDS 2008 data sets 
74. In Table 2.5, above, the unemployment rate by income decile is presented. In South Africa two 
unemployment rates enjoy wide usage; a narrow rate that requires active job search in the last 14 days and 
a broad definition that includes individuals who say that they want a job but who have not actively 
searched for work in the last 14 days. We use the narrow definition here and this unemployment rate is 
shown to be decreasing as we move up the income deciles. The unemployment rate is higher for every 
decile in 2008 than in 1993 and is particularly severe amongst the bottom five deciles. 
75. The previous three tables show clearly that, in the initial post-Apartheid period, participation 
rates increased faster than absorption rates with a consequent increase in unemployment rates across all 
deciles. Since 2000 the aggregate unemployment rate declined marginally driven by increased absorption 
of those individuals in the top six deciles. In the lower deciles the early post-Apartheid trend continued to 
2008. Indeed, this lack of successful integration into the labour market is the reason that many of these 
households find themselves at the bottom of the income distribution. However, the unemployment rates 
plus the evidence from Table 2.1 on employed household members per decile also show that having a job 
on its own is not a guarantee that a household will move into the top deciles. This appears to have 
something to do with the quality of employment too. Unfortunately, our data sets do not allow for 
consistent comparison of formal versus informal employment shares across time. However, evidence from 
other data sets (Leibbrandt, Woolard, McEwen 2009) shows clearly that there was an increase informal 
employment and in self employment over this period. 
Table 2.6: Gini coefficients for per capita income by race and geotype 
  1993 2000 2008 
African 0.54 0.60 0.62 
Coloured 0.44 0.53 0.54 
Asian/Indian 0.47 0.51 0.61 
White 0.43 0.47 0.50 
Rural 0.58 0.62 0.56 
Urban 0.61 0.64 0.67 
Overall 0.66 0.68 0.70 
Source: Own calculations using data from SALDRU 1993, IES 2000 and NIDS 2008 data sets 
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76. Moving now to the overall measurement of income inequality, Table 2.6 shows that the Gini 
coefficient in South Africa rose from 0.66 in 1993 to 0.68 in 2000 and further to 0.70 in 2008.8 Inequality 
by racial group also increased monotonically across the time period, with the Gini coefficient being 
particularly high for Africans and Asian/Indians. There is also stark inequality difference by geotype, with 
inequality in urban and rural areas being measured at 0.56 and 0.67 respectively in 2008, although it 
appears that rural inequality decreased from 1993 to 2008. The high level of inequality is further confirmed 
by the ratios of the income accruing to the 90th percentile to that accruing to the 10th percentile. These 
disparity indices stand at close to 30 for the three years under consideration (see Table A.3.8 of the annex 
III). 
77. Another indication of the path of income inequality in South Africa between 1993 and 2008 is 
given by the generalised entropy measures of inequality (see Annex III, Table A.3.9). The GE(0) and 
GE(1) measures across the country as a whole increased monotonically from 1993 to 2000 to 2008 and the 
same trend as with the Gini coefficient is displayed when disaggregating by racial group. There have been 
significant changes in the composition of racial inequality in that income inequality within racial groups 
has become increasingly more significant than inequality between racial groups. According to the GE(1) 
measure, inequality within racial groups contributed 48% to overall inequality in 1993. By 2008 this figure 
had risen to almost 62%.  
78. In an article in which the conventional interpretation of the between-group measures of the 
general entropy decomposition of inequality is challenged and extended, (Elbers, Lanjouw, Mistiaen, & 
Özler, 2008) it is posited that it may be instructive to view between-group inequality as a percentage of the 
maximum possible level of between-group inequality that can be counterfactually constructed from the 
data while retaining the same number of groups and their relative sizes as well as the same income 
distribution. A key idea behind this assertion is the fact that total inequality is effectively “a measure of 
between-group inequality that would be observed if every household in the population constituted a 
separate group” (Elbers, Lanjouw, Mistiaen, & Özler, 2008). The method of calculating this new measure 
involves “replacing total inequality in the denominator of the conventional ratio with the maximum 
between-group inequality [that can be obtained, given the criteria above]” (Elbers, Lanjouw, Mistiaen, & 
Özler, 2008). This has the added advantage of allowing for a more natural comparison of inequality across 
different times and settings because the measure itself is normalised by parameters present in the data.  
79. Calculating the achieved between-group inequality as a percentage of the maximum possible 
between-group inequality yields some very interesting results (see annex III, Table A.3.10). According to 
the GE(1) measure of inequality in 1993, South African inequality between racial groups stood at almost 
69% of its maximum possible level while maintaining the same underlying population structure and 
distribution of income. By 2000 this figure had fallen to about 50% and the measure stood at 48% in 2008. 
The change in the racial dynamics of inequality was thus most significant in the period between the 
democratic transition and 2000 while the changes between 2000 and 2008 were more muted. 
80. Tables 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9, below, provide a more detailed analysis of the factors influencing 
inequality by decomposing the contributions of the various income sources to overall inequality in any 
given year. It is important to be clear that such decompositions are comparative static exercises; explaining 
factor contributions in each of the three years rather than exploring the role of changes in factors on 
changes across years. Thus, they do not explain changes over time but are helpful in showing whether 
changes have happened over time by comparing the situation in each of the three years.  
                                                     
8 This measure enables us to confirm that inequality worsened in South Africa between 1993 and 2008, and confirm 
what is directly observable through Lorenz Curve analysis (see annex III, Figure 2.12). 
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81. Starting with the labour market it can be seen that the proportion of households receiving income 
from the labour market remained steady at just above 70% in each year. Moreover, this labour market 
income dominates the inequality of household income in each year with a contribution between 85% and 
90%. There are two reasons for this high contribution. First, labour market income is so highly correlated 
with total household income. Then, labour market earnings are very unequally distributed amongst those 
who have such earnings. It is the net impact of these two forces that results in labour market income being 
the major driver of household income inequality in each year.  
82. The growing importance of income from state transfers is highlighted by the fact that in 1993 
about one fifth of households received income from this source whereas in 2008 the figure was almost one 
half. Although the real mean of household monthly income changed very little (between R5 044 and R5 
372) the mean of household monthly income from state transfers grew significantly in real terms. The 
inequality decompositions suggest that these state transfers make very little contribution to inequality in 
any year. This is because they are weakly correlated with total income and the inequality of transfer 
income for those who receive it is not wide. The fact that these grants are not correlated with total income 
implies good targeting at the needy. However, within this decomposition framework, they would need to 
be negatively correlated in order to be seen to play an equalising role on the distribution of household 
income. It seems that grant income is situating a mass of South African households in the lower-middle 
part of income distribution and this leads to the weak but non-negative correlation with the distribution of 
total household income.9 
83. In the decomposition framework reflected in Tables 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9, remittances make a negative 
or low contribution to inequality. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the proportion of households 
receiving remittances grew from 24% in 1993 to 36% in 2000 before falling sharply to 14% in 2008. 
84. Overall, the labour market is shown to play a dominant role in driving inequality. State transfers 
have increased their importance as an income source but in a neutral way rather than as a driver of 
inequality or decreased inequality. In the period since 2000 these increased state transfers are shown to 
have replaced or compensated for remittances; which have shown both a falling average share and a 
slightly less equalising role. 
Table 2.7: Inequality decomposition by income source 1993 
Income 
Source 
% of 
Households 
receiving 
income 
source 
Mean 
household 
monthly 
income from 
source 
% Share 
in total 
income 
Gini for income 
source for 
households 
receiving such 
income 
Gini for 
income 
source for 
all 
households 
Gini 
correlation 
with total 
income 
rankings 
Contribution 
to Gini 
coefficient of 
total income 
% 
share in 
overall 
Gini 
Remittances 24.2 157 3.1 0.52 0.88 -0.1 0.00 -0.5 
Capital 
Income 9.7 437 8.7 0.72 0.97 0.8 0.07 11.6 
State 
transfers 21.9 273 5.4 0.28 0.84 0.0 0.00 0.2 
Labour 
market 73.4 4156 82.4 0.56 0.68 1.0 0.53 88.3 
Other 1.4 21 0.4 0.58 0.99 0.5 0.00 0.3 
Total 5044 100.0 0.60 0.60 100.0 
Source: Own calculations using data from SALDRU 1993 data set 
                                                     
9  To some extent this decomposition framework understates the impact of grants. Section 3.5 below assesses 
the impact of grants by comparing the situation in each year with and without grants. This shows quite 
clearly that grant income is shifting a substantial number of poor households up towards the poverty line 
and therefore has to be equalizing the distribution of income. 
 DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2010)1 
 35
Table 2.8: Inequality decomposition by income source 2000 
Income 
Source 
% of 
Households 
receiving 
income 
source 
Mean 
household 
monthly 
income 
from source 
% Share 
in total 
income 
Gini for 
income source 
for households 
receiving such 
income 
Gini for 
income 
source for 
all 
household 
Gini 
correlation 
with total 
income 
rankings 
Contribution 
to Gini 
coefficient of 
total income 
% share 
in 
overall 
Gini 
Remittances 36.4 370 6.9 0.60 0.85 0.23 0.01 2.1 
Capital 
Income 5.6 233 4.3 0.65 0.98 0.74 0.03 4.8 
State 
transfers 24.7 259 4.7 0.35 0.85 0.12 0.00 0.7 
Labour 
market 71.8 4438 82.6 0.65 0.75 0.95 0.59 90.9 
Other 4.6 80 1.5 0.70 0.99 0.66 0.01 1.5 
Total 5372 100.0 0.65 0.65 100.0 
Source: Own calculations using data from the IES 2000 data set 
Table 2.9: Inequality Decomposition by Income Source 2008 
Income 
Source 
% of 
Households 
receiving 
income 
source 
Mean 
household 
monthly 
income 
from 
source 
% 
Share 
in total 
income 
Gini for 
income 
source for 
households 
receiving 
such income 
Gini for 
income 
source for 
all 
households 
Gini 
correlation 
with total 
income 
rankings 
Contribution 
to Gini 
coefficient of 
total income 
% share 
in 
overall 
Gini 
Remittances 14.0 282 5.4 0.75 0.96 0.64 0.03 5.1 
Capital 
Income 7.8 414 7.9 0.61 0.97 0.83 0.06 9.7 
State 
transfers 47.8 412 7.9 0.44 0.73 0.03 0.00 0.3 
Labour 
market 71.9 4128 78.8 0.64 0.74 0.95 0.56 85.0 
Total  5236 100.0  0.66  0.66 100.0 
Source: Own calculations using data from the NIDS 2008 data set 
2.3 Trends in Poverty  
85. Analysis of absolute poverty involves drawing a poverty line and concerning ourselves only with 
the welfare of those that fall below the line.  Obviously this understanding of poverty renders analyses 
sensitive to the choice of poverty line, and the welfare measure.  We can work around the former problem 
by considering a broad range of poverty lines rather than a single one.  In the body of this report we make 
use of lower and upper bound poverty lines as recommended by Hoogeveen and Özler (2006).  However, 
we assess sensitivity to these choice of lines by using a fairly standard set of international (absolute and 
relative) poverty lines; namely, the $1/day class, 40% median per capita income and 50% median per 
capita income.  The dollar value of all these lines (in purchasing power terms) was presented earlier in Box 
1 in Chapter 1. In the annex III (Table A.3.11) we present a set of poverty tables across a whole set of 
poverty lines for 2008. The problem of the choice of the income measure is equally difficult to deal with.  
We adopt net household per capita income as the income measure, as it is most easily comparable across 
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the datasets available. Tables that use an adjustment for household size10 are available but are not discussed 
in the text. 
Table 2.10: Poverty measures from 1993-2008 
   Poverty line = R949  Poverty line = R515 
 Population  p0 p1 p2  p0 p1 p2 
1993 40 147 932  0.72 0.47 0.36  0.56 0.32 0.22 
2000 42 357 140  0.71 0.45 0.33  0.54 0.29 0.19 
2008 48 687 000   0.70 0.44 0.32  0.54 0.28 0.19 
Source: Own calculations using data from SALDRU 1993, IES 2000 and NIDS 2008 data sets 
86. Table 2.10 shows the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty indices for the upper and lower 
bound poverty lines previously mentioned across the three datasets. P0 is the poverty headcount ratio; P1 
the mean poverty gap (as a percentage of the poverty line); and P2 the squared mean poverty gap. These 
measures put increasing emphasis on the poorest of the poor. Looking at the headcount ratio for both 
poverty lines it seems clear that poverty has fallen slightly over the 15 year period. The changes in the 
mean poverty gap and the squared mean poverty gap ratios suggest that when taking the depth and severity 
of poverty into account, the gains over the period have been slightly higher than indicated by the headcount 
ratio.  
87. After this review of the aggregate picture we now look at the decompositions of poverty across a 
few standard categorical variables.  We report poverty headcount ratios and the associated poverty shares 
of each of the various groups in tables.  For this we show the figures using the lower bound poverty line as 
this is where the trends are clearest.  All tables also include population estimates across the categorical 
groups.  Tables that use alternative poverty lines mentioned in section 1 and include the mean poverty gap 
ratio and its square are available in the annex III.  The dominance analysis that follows shows how the 
conclusions of this type of analysis can be extended across a continuous range of poverty lines, without the 
limitation of a number of discrete choices.   
                                                     
10 Dividing by the square root of household size, rather than the unadjusted size. This will obviously have the effect of 
increasing the size of the welfare measure for larger households relative to smaller households.  Given that household 
size is generally decreasing in wealth, the adjustment will result in an increase (on average) of the welfare of poorer 
households relative to wealthier households. 
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Table 2.11: Individual level poverty by race and gender (Poverty line R515 per capita per month) 
   Population   Head count   Poverty share 
  1993 2000 2008  1993 2000 2008  1993 2000 2008 
African female  0.40 0.41 0.42  0.72 0.66 0.68  0.51 0.50 0.52 
African male  0.36 0.38 0.38  0.66 0.61 0.60  0.42 0.43 0.41 
Coloured female  0.04 0.05 0.05  0.32 0.32 0.36  0.02 0.03 0.03 
Coloured male  0.04 0.04 0.04  0.29 0.30 0.35  0.02 0.02 0.03 
Indian/Asian female  0.01 0.01 0.01  0.12 0.11 0.11  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Indian/Asian male  0.01 0.01 0.01  0.12 0.09 0.19  0.00 0.00 0.00 
White female  0.06 0.05 0.05  0.05 0.06 0.04  0.01 0.01 0.00 
White male  0.06 0.05 0.04  0.06 0.08 0.03  0.01 0.01 0.00 
Source: Own calculations using data from SALDRU 1993, IES 2000 and NIDS 2008 data sets 
88. Table 2.11 shows the poverty decomposition across race and gender using the lower bound 
poverty line. We can see very clearly from the table that the decline in poverty incidence is made up 
mostly of the decline in poverty incidence among the African population, particularly males. However, the 
increase in the population share of the African group together with only muted changes in poverty among 
the other groups, results in a mere 1% change in poverty share, upwards for African women, and 
downwards for African men. Coloured poverty incidence, both male and female actually increases over the 
period, although this does not have a large effect on overall poverty due to their combined shares of the 
population being only about 9%.  
DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2010)1 
 38
Table 2.12: Individual level poverty by geotype (Poverty line R515 per capita per month) 
   Population   Head count   Poverty share  
  1993 2000 2008  1993 2000 2008  1993 2000 2008 
Rural  0.51 0.45 0.40  0.77 0.74 0.77  0.70 0.62 0.57 
Urban  0.49 0.55 0.60  0.34 0.37 0.39  0.30 0.38 0.43 
Source: Own calculations using data from SALDRU 1993, IES 2000 and NIDS 2008 data sets 
89. Table 2.12 shows the poverty incidence across urban and rural areas.  As is clear from the 
population figures, the influence of demographic shifts over time complicates the analysis of the evolution 
of poverty significantly. Over the period poverty incidence barely changed in rural areas, while it increased 
in urban areas. However, due to the large urbanization of the period from the high poverty rural areas to 
lower poverty urban areas, overall poverty incidence declined. This is shown in the change in poverty 
incidence shares, with the share of urban areas in poverty increasing dramatically over the period.   
Table 2.13: Poverty by education of household head (Poverty line R515 per capita per month) 
   Population   Head count  Poverty share 
  1993 2000 2008  1993 2000 2008  1993 2000 2008 
No schooling  0.26 0.21 0.18  0.81 0.80 0.80  0.38 0.31 0.27 
Grade 1-3  0.06 0.07 0.06  0.77 0.76 0.77  0.09 0.10 0.09 
Grade 4-6  0.17 0.16 0.14  0.69 0.67 0.75  0.21 0.20 0.19 
Grade 7-9  0.22 0.23 0.19  0.53 0.55 0.59  0.21 0.23 0.21 
Grade 10/12  0.19 0.21 0.31  0.25 0.30 0.37  0.08 0.12 0.21 
Diploma or certificate, 
without Grade 12 
 0.01 0.02 0.01  0.05 0.14 0.11  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Diploma or certificate, 
with Grade 12 
 0.05 0.04 0.05  0.07 0.09 0.05  0.01 0.01 0.01 
Degree  0.02 0.04 0.03  0.04 0.06 0.02  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other/Missing  0.01 0.01 0.02  0.56 0.48 0.55  0.02 0.01 0.02 
Source: Own calculations using data from SALDRU 1993, IES 2000 and NIDS 2008 data sets 
90. In a departure from looking at the individual level poverty, Table 2.13 shows poverty by 
educational attainment of household head.  In the South African schooling system, grades 1 through 7 
constitute primary schooling (ISCED level 1), grades 8 and 9 constitute lower secondary (ISCED level 2), 
grades 10 to 12 constitute upper secondary (ISCED level 3) with a national school-leaving examination at 
the end of grade 12. Then, with regard to the post-schooling levels, a diploma or certificate without 
complete schooling would be at ISCED level 4 (post-secondary, non-tertiary) and diploma with grade 12 
or degree would be at ISCED level 5 and, in a few cases, ISCED level 6. 
91. Once again we have substantial changes in the distribution of the population of household heads.  
A significant decrease in the number of household heads with no schooling or little schooling is clearly 
linked to the increase in the number of household heads with grades 10-12.  There have been only slight 
changes in the number of household heads with degrees and other types of tertiary education.   
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92. The poverty incidence in households headed by people with education below grade 10 has 
generally risen, although this is most notable in the categories that have decreased in size substantially. The 
change in poverty incidence among households where the household head has education of grades 10-12 is 
quite striking.  One might venture to conjecture that this is due to the distribution within these grades 
shifting downwards.  However, over the period the mean grade attainment within this group actually 
increased.  It would seem that either the average quality of this schooling has declined over the period, or 
there has been a decline in the labour market demand for people with this level of education.  The large 
shift in poverty incidence in the other/missing category in 2000 raises some questions about data quality 
here.   
Table 2.14: Individual level of poverty by household structure (Poverty line R515 per capita per month) 
   Population    p0    p0share  
  1993 2000 2008  1993 2000 2008  1993 2000 2008 
Single adult  0.10 0.13 0.16  0.56 0.50 0.53  0.10 0.12 0.16 
Two or more adults  0.90 0.87 0.84  0.56 0.55 0.55  0.90 0.88 0.84 
             
No children  0.15 0.18 0.21  0.18 0.24 0.25  0.05 0.08 0.09 
One or more children  0.85 0.82 0.79  0.63 0.61 0.62  0.95 0.92 0.91 
Source: Own calculations using data from SALDRU 1993, IES 2000 and NIDS 2008 data sets 
93. Table 2.14 shows poverty incidence and poverty share by household structure.  Looking at the 
number of adults in households, we can see that the poverty shares follow the changes in household 
structure almost exactly.  Over the period, there was a substantial increase in the number of single adult 
households, from 10% in 1993 to 13% and then 16% in 2000 and 2008 respectively.  The decomposition of 
the incidence of poverty followed this shift exactly, with both groups maintaining the same rate of poverty 
and thus maintaining their shares of the period. 
Table 2.15: Individual level of poverty by age structure (Poverty line R515 per capita per month) 
Age 
Cohorts 
Population Poverty Incidence 
(Head Count Ratio) 
Poverty Share 
  1993 2000 2008 1993 2000 2008 1993 2000 2008 
0 to 10 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.68 0.64 0.67 0.31 0.31 0.29 
11 to 15 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.66 0.64 0.67 0.14 0.13 0.13 
16 to 20 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.64 0.62 0.63 0.13 0.12 0.13 
21 to 30 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.15 0.16 0.16 
31 to 59 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.20 0.22 0.23 
60 to 70 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.51 0.49 0.42 0.05 0.04 0.04 
71+ 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.51 0.50 0.46 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Overall 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.56 0.54 0.54 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Source: Own calculations using data from SALDRU 1993, IES 2000 and NIDS 2008 data sets 
94. Table 2.15 interrogates changes in poverty incidence and poverty shares by age cohorts.  The 
cohorts are chosen in order to give a sense of changes in child poverty, changes in working age poverty 
and changes in the poverty of the aged. The population shares of the cohorts show a stable picture. The 
DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2010)1 
 40
only notable shift is a decrease in the share of the youngest group that is counterbalanced by a slight 
increase in the 31-59 cohort. Given this stability, the changes in the poverty shares will be driven 
predominantly by changes in poverty incidence within the cohorts.  
95. Generally, poverty incidence is the highest for the three child cohorts and for the two oldest 
cohorts. Indeed, the one dramatic change in incidence over time is the decline in poverty over time for the 
two older cohorts.  Given that these cohorts are outside of the labour market, this is an indication of the 
increasing support that these older groups are receiving through the state old age pension.  Given this clear 
evidence of the impact of government support and the fact that the government has rolled out a huge child 
support grant programme in the post 2000 period (see Chapter 3 for details), it is disappointing to see that 
the incidence of child poverty remained high and declined only marginally over time.  Within the working 
age population, poverty incidence in the 21-30 cohort is significantly higher than in the 31-59 cohort. This 
highlights the importance of youth unemployment and the difficulty that the young working age population 
have in successfully integrating into the labour market. This situation has not worsened over time.   
96. This labour market connection to poverty is further explored in Table 2.16 below.  The table 
looks at the relationship between the poverty status of individuals given the labour market status of their 
household’s. No worker households are seen to have grown from 28% of the population to 31% of the 
population over time. Their poverty incidence, at 80% or more, is by far the highest of all the groups; 
reflecting clearly that the deleterious consequences to individuals of their household’s having no access to 
the labour market. Such circumstances are almost a guarantee that one will be poor. From 1993 to 2000 
this incidence fell but then rose again from 2000 to 2008. The consequence of the extremely high poverty 
incidence is that such individuals make up a much larger share of the poor than their share of the 
population. 
97. Individuals living in one worker households make up an increasing share of the population over 
time; rising from 38% to 41% from 1993 to 2008.  Around 50% of such individuals are poor in all periods 
although this has declined from 54% to 48% over the three snapshots. This incidence is still very high, 
clearly emphasising the point that having an employed member in one’s household is not a guarantee that 
an individual will not be poor. Indeed, the poverty incidence of those individuals living in households with 
two employed household members or more is close to 35% over the post-Apartheid period. Clearly the 
quality of employment and the quality of support coming from the labour market are important poverty 
issues alongside the major importance of the lack of employment.  This is not to deny that this two or more 
worker group is the best off by a long way. However, the fact the population share of this group has 
declined markedly over time is worrying as it indicates an increased vulnerability to a job loss over time.  
Unfortunately, as noted earlier in the discussion of inequality, these three data sets do not allow for a 
nuanced discussion of the impact of the changing sectoral composition of employment and quality of 
employment over time. 
Table 2.16: Individual level of poverty by household labour market status (Poverty line R515 per capita per 
month) 
Population Poverty Incidence 
(Head Count Ratio) Poverty Share 
1993 2000 2008 1993 2000 2008 1993 2000 2008 
No workers 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.89 0.78 0.81 0.44 0.40 0.46 
One worker 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.54 0.50 0.48 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Two or more workers 0.34 0.33 0.28 0.32 0.39 0.34 0.20 0.24 0.17 
Source: Own calculations using data from SALDRU 1993, IES 2000 and NIDS 2008 data sets 
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98. A cumulative distribution function (CDF) which plots the poverty headcount ratio against 
household per capita income allows us to illustrate poverty incidence for all possible poverty lines.  
Certainly we are not interested in all poverty lines11, but by restricting our concern to a broad interval of 
possible poverty lines we present a more general analysis and avoid pinning our conclusions on the 
arbitrary choice of poverty line.  Using CDF’s to compare poverty over time allows us a more robust 
defence of poverty rankings, and easily highlights cases that require more attention (i.e. when the CDF’s 
cross).  Where CDF’s cross, the use of second order and third order poverty dominance analysis can be 
conclusive in the rankings of poverty.  
Figure 2.7: CDF’s for 1993, 2000 and 2008 
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Source: Own calculations using data from SALDRU 1993, IES 2000 and NIDS 2008 data sets 
99. The graph above shows the CDF’s of household per capita incomes across the three datasets from 
1993 to 2008.  The influence of zero incomes can be clearly seen in the bottom left corner.  Excluding 
zeroes does not substantially alter this graph.  However, a version excluding zeroes is included in the annex 
III (Figure A.3.2).  We can clearly see that for all poverty lines below R1 500 per capita per month12, there 
is clear first order poverty dominance of 1993 over 2000 and 2008.  Since the CDF’s of the 2008 and 2000 
data cross, we cannot say which has greater poverty in general; the answer will depend on the measure we 
use and the poverty line.  We can conclude from this that poverty has fallen on average since 1993, but it is 
not clear if poverty has increased or fallen since 2000.  Second and third order dominance analysis may 
result in a clear ranking of poverty between 2000 and 2008, but this is beyond the scope of this report.   
                                                     
11 Where none of the CDF’s cross each other at any point there is no need to consider any particular sections of the CDF 
in order to categorically rank poverty across the groups.   
12 It should be kept in mind that 81%, 80% and 78% of the 1993, 2000 and 2008 household per capita incomes are below 
this respectively.   
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100. Figure 2.8 illustrates the restricted13 CDFs of South Africa across racial groups in 2008. Similar 
figures for 1993 and 2000 can be found in the annex III (Figures A.3.3 and A.3.4). These are not shown 
here because there are no changes in poverty ranking across the three. The two vertical lines mark the 
South African lower and upper bound poverty lines from left to right respectively. The far left end of the 
CDF (left of the lower bound line) is distorted by the effect of zero’s in the datasets, particularly the 1993 
and 2000 data as mentioned previously and results from poverty lines that are much lower than the lower 
bound line should thus be treated with caution. Across the rest of the x-axis, the poverty ranking of the 
racial groups is very clear. We see clear poverty dominance across population groups in the order of 
African, Coloured, Indian/Asian and White. This shows that the legacy of Apartheid is strongly persistent 
even in 2008.    
Figure 2.8: CDF’s across racial groups in 2008 
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Source: Own calculations using the NIDS 2008 data set 
101. Figure 2.9 shows CDF’s across geotypes. The figure reveals very clear first order poverty 
dominance of urban areas over rural areas. Changes in poverty incidence from a special perspective are 
negligible (as can be seen from the CDF’s from 1993 and 2000 in the annex III (Figures A.3.5 and A.3.6). 
However as previously noted, there has been quite a significant amount of urbanization which has driven a 
big increase in the urban share of poverty.   
                                                     
13 This is restricted to per capita income below R1500 per month 
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Figure 2.9: CDF’s across geotypes in 2008 
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Source: Own calculations using data from SALDRU 1993, IES 2000 and NIDS 2008 data sets 
2.4 Evidence from NIDS on non-money-metric poverty  
102. The final piece of empirical evidence in this chapter seeks to update the discussion of non 
money-metric well-being that ended chapter 1. This discussion is important because, evidence from a 
number of data sets showed that the improvement in access to services and to assets over the post-
Apartheid years had been much stronger than the improvements in money-metric poverty and inequality. 
Given that the analysis of income poverty and inequality in this chapter has confirmed a picture of positive 
but modest gains in poverty and a worsening of inequality in the 2008 NIDS data, it becomes important to 
ascertain whether this dissonance between income and non-money metric wellbeing follows through in the 
latest NIDS data too.  
103. Figures 2.9 and 2.10 compare the NIDS data on access to services and assets to comparable data 
from the General Household Survey (GHS) of 2006 and 2007. The tables are taken from Bhorat et al 
(2009) and it is clear that the NIDS data on services and on assets matches up well with the GHS data. For 
most assets and services the NIDS figures are slightly higher than the GHS figures.  In chapter 1 we 
reported on the work of Bhorat et al (2006) that compared access to services and assets were compared 
between 1993, 1999 and 2004 with improvements over time. The 2004 data was from the 2004 GHS. Thus, 
it is not hard to extrapolate from there to 2006, 2007 and 2008.  This extrapolation reveals that the 
improvements in non money-metric wellbeing continued through to 2008. 
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Figure 2.10: Access to services 
 
Source: Bhorat et al. (2009), own calculations 
Figure 2.11: Access to assets 
 
Source: Bhorat et al. (2009), own calculations. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
104. We end off this chapter by looking across the pieces of evidence about inequality and poverty in 
order to ascertain whether they suggest obvious drivers of inequality and poverty and of poverty 
alleviation. Measured inequality increased consistently between 1993 and 2008. In this regard, our 
empirical work on inequality confirms and updates the findings of others that we reviewed in Chapter 1.  
With regard to poverty, we showed that aggregate poverty improved marginally between 1993 and 2008.  
This trend accords with the analysis of others, although other data sets suggest a more marked 
improvement in poverty.  Our non-money-metric picture of access to services (public assets) and to private 
assets is in line with other research which suggests large and continuing improvements in these dimensions 
of well-being since 1993. Poverty, when measured in terms of these dimensions has improved strongly. 
105. Within the aggregate inequality picture, our analysis of the changing racial dynamics of 
inequality showed that the between racial group contribution to inequality fell markedly in the period 
between the democratic transition and 2000 while the changes between 2000 and 2008 were more muted. 
This is true even one uses benchmarks against a maximum possible between-group inequality in any time 
period.  The decompositions of inequality by income source show that the labour market plays a dominant 
role in driving inequality and that we should look to labour market dynamics to understand both the 
increased aggregate inequality and the changing racial shares. State transfers have increased their 
importance as an income source but not in a way that has narrowed the distribution of per capita income. 
They have, however compensated for the decreasing share of remittance income.  
106. The income source decompositions suggest that the dominance of the labour market as a driver of 
inequality is due both to the large percentage of households with no access to the labour market and to the 
high inequality of household labour market earnings for those households with access to such earnings. 
Indeed, this latter effect seems to be stronger. The analysis of participation, absorption and unemployment 
by deciles in this chapter assists in unpacking this further. It shows clearly that, in the initial post-Apartheid 
period, participation rates increased faster than absorption rates with a consequent increase in 
unemployment rates across all deciles. Since 2000 the aggregate unemployment rate declined marginally 
driven by increased absorption of those individuals in the top six deciles. In the lower deciles the early 
post-Apartheid trend continued to 2008. Indeed, this lack of successful integration into the labour market is 
the reason that many of these households find themselves at the bottom of the income distribution. 
However, unemployment rates remain high into the higher deciles. This, plus the evidence on employed 
household members per decile show that having a job on its own is not a guarantee that a household will 
move into the top deciles. The quality of employment must be considered too.  
107. Moving onto the details of our poverty analysis, the aggregate stability of money-metric poverty 
is reflected in rankings and shares by race that barely changed at all from 1993 to 2008. However, within 
this situation, there were some notable changes. We documented sizeable increases in urban poverty 
shares. While a part of this increased share is driven by the increase in the incidence of urban poverty, the 
bulk of this increased share is driven by the sharply rising share of the population living in urban areas over 
the post-Apartheid period. There is also an increased share of poverty attributable to those with a level of 
education between grade 10 to grade 12 (corresponding to ISCED level 3, i.e. upper secondary education).  
This increased share was attributable to both the increased share of the population that falls in this 
educational band and to the increased incidence of poverty for this group.  
108. It is the younger South Africans who are coming out of school with higher levels of education 
than their parents that are pushing up the average years of education of the population. In this chapter we 
document the fact that the younger age cohorts have the highest incidence and shares of poverty and that 
this has not improved notably over time. The fact that these better-educated young people remain poor 
suggests that the labour market has not been playing a strongly virtuous role as a driver of poverty 
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alleviation over the post-Apartheid period. There is some evidence from labour economists (Woolard and 
Woolard (2007) and Lam and Leibbrandt (2009)) that those who successfully complete their secondary 
schooling (completion of Grade 12) get strong returns on their education. However, the returns to those 
with less than Grade 12 have fallen.  
109. Even this is uneven though. While the incidence of poverty is very high for those with no 
schooling or with very low levels of schooling, it has not increased over time. This accords with the 
findings of Bhorat and van der Westhuizen (2009) showing that, although growth between 1995 and 2005 
has been pro-poor on aggregate, it is the bottom decile that has benefitted and is driving this. The rest of 
the poor did not benefit strongly from the strong economic growth of the period.  
110. If the labour market is not driving the improvements in poverty then what is? Our descriptive 
pictures flag the fact that individuals with very low levels of education and with no workers in the 
household have the highest poverty incidence but they have not become poorer over time. Rather those 
with no children have become poorer. This seems to be flagging the importance of social assistance. Add 
to this our findings that the incidence and share of poverty of those aged 60 and older has fallen markedly 
since 1993. As this group is not economically active, this can only be due to the support that they receive 
through the state old age pension. This policy and other assistance policies are explored at length in 
Chapter 3. However, as a transition into this chapter, we explore the importance of government grants in 
Table 2.17 by looking at changes in poverty over time, with and without accounting for government grants. 
These grants include the State Old Age Pension, the Disability Grant, the Child Support Grant and the 
Foster Care Grant. It can be seen from the table that government grant income does not change the 
headcount (p0) substantially. This accords with our analysis of child poverty in this chapter. However, 
when p1 and p2 measures that are more sensitive to the depth of poverty are used, then poverty is seen to 
improve markedly due to government grants. Moreover, this effect has become stronger between 1993 and 
2008 and especially between 2000 and 2008. This time period accords with the substantial roll-out of the 
child support grant. Without government grants poverty would worsen over time rather than improve. 
Table 2.17: Poverty with and without government grants 
Poverty when income includes government grants 
Year 
Poverty 
line=R949 
Poverty 
line=R515 
p0 p1 p2 p0 p1 p2 
1993 0.72 0.47 0.36 0.56 0.32 0.22
2000 0.71 0.45 0.33 0.54 0.29 0.19
2008 0.70 0.44 0.32 0.54 0.28 0.18
Poverty when income excludes government grants 
Year 
Poverty 
line=R949 
Poverty 
line=R515 
p0 p1 p2 p0 p1 p2 
1993 0.73 0.53 0.43 0.60 0.4 0.32
2000 0.72 0.5 0.4 0.57 0.37 0.29
2008 0.71 0.54 0.46 0.60 0.44 0.37
Source: Own calculations using data from SALDRU 1993, IES 2000 and NIDS 2008 data sets 
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CHAPTER 3: THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE GRANTS IN REDUCING POVERTY 
AND INEQUALITY 
111. There are broadly two concepts of social security in South Africa: the insurance concept and the 
redistribution concept. The insurance concept focuses on insuring workers against the risk of income loss 
and hence it increases lifetime income smoothening. Most programmes based on this concept are financed 
out of premiums and contributions and benefits depend on earnings. In South Africa, there exists an 
Unemployment Insurance Fund which serves this function. “Redistribution” programmes, on the other 
hand, do not focus on workers alone and the key element is poverty relief. In South Africa, the term “social 
assistance grants” refers to non-contributory and income-tested benefits provided by the state to vulnerable 
groups unable to provide for their own minimum needs, such as the disabled, the elderly and young 
children in poor households. Benefits are financed out of general tax revenues and hence there is no link 
between contributions and benefits.   
112. While we briefly describe unemployment insurance, the focus of this chapter is on social 
assistance grants as these play a particularly important role in reducing poverty and inequality in South 
Africa.  The chapter also touches on one particular form of active labour market policy that has a clear link 
to poverty reduction, namely public works programmes.   
113. We deal first with the Unemployment Insurance Fund and the Expanded Public Works 
Programme before giving much more detailed attention to the significant system of social assistance 
grants.  
3.1 The Unemployment Insurance Fund 
114. Contributory social security funds provide conditional income support or compensation for 
defined-risk events. The present social security schemes in South Africa include the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund (UIF), the Compensation Funds and the Road Accident Fund. They are financed through 
mandatory levies and taxes. 
115. The Compensation Funds provide medical care and income benefits to workers who are injured 
while at work or who develop occupational diseases. The Compensation Funds also pay survivor benefits 
to the families of workers that are fatally injured while on the job. The Road Accident Fund provides 
compensation for the loss of earnings, loss of support and compensation for general damages, medical and 
funeral costs to victims of road accidents caused by the negligent or wrongful driving of another motor 
vehicle.  We do not consider either of these Funds further as they provide very specific risk benefits that 
are not directly related to poverty alleviation.  
116. The UIF provides short-term income support to individuals that are not currently working 
because they became unemployed or ill or went on maternity leave.  Benefits are only paid in the period 
immediately following the cessation of work and the person must have been contributing to the UIF at the 
time the event related to the cessation of work occurred.  The UIF pays benefits to contributors in cases of 
unemployment, illness, maternity or adoption of a child.  It pays benefits to the worker’s dependants if the 
worker dies.  (This survivor benefit is of the same value as the unemployment benefit would have been had 
the worker become unemployed instead of dying.)   
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117. With the exception of public servants, any worker that is employed for at least 24 hours a month 
by a single employer must contribute to the UIF.  The worker and the employer each contribute an amount 
equal to 1% of monthly salary, capped at R124.78 (i.e. if the worker earns more than R12478 per month, 
the employee and employee will still each contribute R124.78 per month). The employer is responsible for 
paying over the contributions on behalf of both the employer and the employee.  While we were unable to 
get accurate figures on contributors from the Department of Labour, we estimate that approximately 8 
million workers (and their employers) contribute to the Fund.  
118. If a worker has been contributing to the Fund for four years or more, then benefits can be 
received for up to 238 days. If the worker has been contributing for a shorter period, then he/she can claim 
1 day for every 6 days worked while contributing to the Fund. In the case of maternity leave, a worker can 
only claim up to 121 days. The UIF pays a percentage of the wage that was being earned at the time that 
the worker was contributing to the Fund. The highest amount that can be paid is 58% of what was being 
earned per day. 
119. As shown in Table 3.1, expenditure by the UIF was approximately R4.5 billion in the 2008/09 
fiscal year while revenues exceeded R12 billion. The Fund is currently running a large surplus and there 
are various policy proposals circulating about possible reforms to the system. One possibility would be to 
extend the claim period; another would be to provide a “workseeker’s allowance” once benefits have 
expired.   
Table 3.1:  UIF revenues and expenditures 
 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Revenue 7 841 9 467 11 324 12 023 
Expenditure 3 635 3 578 3 592 4 460 
Source: National Treasury, 2009 
120. As shown in Table 3.2, 442 000 people claimed unemployment benefits in 2008/09.  (Given that 
the maximum claim period is 238 days and many claimants will receive benefits for a shorter time, this 
implies that significantly less than 442 000 people were in receipt of unemployment benefits at any given 
time.)  This figure is in stark contrast to the number of unemployed, which currently stands at 4 125 000 
according to the strict (narrow, official) definition or 5 642 000 according to the expanded (broad) 
definition (Stats SA, 2009).  An amount of R2 341 million was paid out in benefits in 2008/09 which 
implies that the average beneficiary received a total amount of R5 296.  
 
Table 3.2: UIF benefits and recipient numbers 
 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Benefits (R million)     
Unemployment benefits 2 065 1 991 2 031 2 341 
Illness benefits 187 180 187 211 
Maternity/adoption benefits 353 418 460 492 
Survivor’s benefits 283 248 243 292 
Beneficiaries (thousand)     
Unemployment 451 421 397 442 
Illness 26 30 25 28 
Maternity/adoption 81 96 89 99 
Survivor’s benefits 31 25 16 18 
Source: National Treasury, 2009 
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121. Table 3.3 shows the previous incomes of those who made application for unemployment benefits 
during the 2006 calendar year. As far as unemployment benefit claimants are concerned, women are 
congregated at the lower end of the wage spectrum, almost one third of them (31.5%) having earned less 
than R1000 per month before they lost their jobs, as opposed to about 11 per cent for the men.  
Table 3.3: Previous incomes of unemployment benefit claimants, 2006 
Income category (R/month) Men Women 
R1-299 (column %) 0.1 0.6 
R300-599 0.9 4.2 
R600-999 10.9 26.7 
R1000-1999 37.7 34.3 
R2000-3999 30.7 22.8 
R4000-5999 9.3 5.2 
R6000-7999 3.8 2.4 
R8000-9999 3.1 1.9 
R10000-12747 3.5 1.9 
Number of claimants 221 415 138 878 
Source: Meth (unpublished) 
122. Given that the UIF receives contributions from approximately 8 million workers and pays 
benefits for up to 238 days, it may seem surprising that less than 10% of the (strictly) unemployed are in 
receipt of unemployment benefits at any given time. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that slightly 
more than half (55%) of the unemployed report that they have never worked (Stats SA, 2007) and thus 
have not had the opportunity to have contributed to the UIF. Of those that have worked before, 44% have 
been unemployed for more than a year and would have exhausted their benefits if they were ever eligible 
for them. Thus, while the UIF clearly has an important role to play in providing replacement income to the 
short-term unemployed with work experience, the vast majority of the unemployed fall outside of this 
system.  
3.2 Public Works Programmes 
123. The “Expanded Public Works Programme” (EPWP) was installed in 2004. Public Works 
Programmes did, however, exist in South Africa prior to this.  During the early 1990s, negotiations took 
place between organized labour, the construction industry and government over the use of labour intensive 
construction methods. These engagements resulted in the signing of a temporary Framework Agreement 
for labour intensive construction. The principles in this Framework Agreement were later written into a 
Code of Good Practice for Special Public Works Programmes which was formally gazetted by the 
Department of Labour in 2002. The Code of Good Practice sets targets for the employment of youth, 
women and people living with disabilities on Public Works Programmes.  It also requires that relevant 
community-based organisations be consulted regarding the selection of workers to be employed on 
projects. The Code also allows for special conditions of employment for workers employed by contractors 
on labour intensive projects, including the use of task-based payment systems, and the setting of payments 
for tasks based on consideration of the local going rate for unskilled labour. It limits the duration of 
employment under these special conditions and provides PWP workers with an entitlement to training. The 
Code of Good Practice therefore establishes a PWP employment framework based on a concept of PWPs 
as a mechanism for providing unemployed people with a combination of work experience and training. 
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124. The national government has also initiated a range of environmental PWPs since 1994, including, 
for example, Working for Water and the Land Care and Coastal Care programmes. A number of provinces 
and municipalities have also initiated their own PWPs. 
125. EPWP was implemented in 2004. Under this scheme, all government bodies and state 
corporations are required to make a concerted effort to assist the unskilled unemployed population. 
Through the use of public expenditure, temporary, generally unskilled employment is created for the 
jobless. Such temporary employment is coupled with on the job skills development and training. The 
intention was that this would provide the participants leaving the programme with a better chance of 
finding employment outside of the temporary job structure.  
126. Over the past four years EPWP has grown steadily. It has provided more than 1 million work 
opportunities in 2008. It should be noted that a “work opportunity” is a short-term job, i.e. these figures 
have not been converted to full-time equivalents.  
Table 3.4: Work opportunities and budget for EPWP, 2004/05-2008/09 
 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Net number of work 
opportunities created 393 441 503 843 592 990 1 107 162 1 449 806 
Total expenditure (including 
professional fees) in billions R7.8 R6.1 R11.2 R30.2 R54.2 
Source: Department of Public Works, Republic of South Africa (available: www.epwp.gov.za) 
127. It is important to note, however, that only a small proportion of the expenditure figures above 
represent wages paid to EPWP participants.  As shown in Table 3.5, in 2006/07, the EPWP wage bill was 
less than R1 billion which should be seen in comparison to the Unemployment Insurance Fund that paid 
out R2.8 billion that year  or the value of Social Assistance Grants which was R57 billion that same year 
(National Treasury, 2009). 
Table 3.5: Wage bill for all EPWP sectors 
Fiscal year Wage bill (current prices) Wage bill (constant R2000 prices) 
2004/05  R 823,202,981 R 823,202,981 
2005/06  R 635,652,856 R 608,955,436 
2006/07  R 917,520,088 R 846,871,041 
Source: Hemson, 2007 
128. Poverty reduction, addressing unemployment, skills development, and service delivery are stated 
objectives of the EPWP, although various documents and stakeholders articulate and emphasize these 
differently. In the EPWP foundation documents there is no explicit mention of social protection, rather it is 
projected that providing temporary employment and training will lead on to further gainful economic 
activities. This series of activities – short term employment, training, and successful exit strategies leading 
to more permanent employment – is designed to achieve the alleviation of poverty.   
129. In June 2008, Cabinet gave approval for proceeding with the development of a second phase of 
the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) which began in early 2009.  This five-year expansion of 
the programme is known as EPWP II, and there are plans in place for improved administrative 
arrangements and new targets to lengthen the duration of jobs created and improve its environmental, 
 DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2010)1 
 51
social and developmental impact. Extension of the programme aims to increase the number of full-year 
equivalent job opportunities to over 400 000 over the next five years.  
130. EPWP II will concentrate on three areas:  
• Longer-term public-sector employment, such as in home-based care and community health 
services, directly funded by departments and supported by targeted training and skills 
development. 
• Project-based employment in construction, rehabilitation and environmental programmes, 
supported through performance-based incentive allocations to cover basic wages in activities 
with scope for increased labour-intensity, implemented by national and provincial departments 
and municipalities.  
• A new component of programmes funded or co-funded by government, but managed by non-state 
actors such as non-profit organisations, religious and community-based organisations. 
131. We performed some empirical analysis of EPWP beneficiaries based on the Labour Force 
Surveys.  The September 2007 Labour Force Survey included a specific module on EPWP. From this data, 
we were able to conclude that almost one-third of adults had heard of EPWP, yet more than twice this 
amount were unaware of the government programme. In addition, the data indicated that EPWP awareness 
did not differ significantly by age, with the exception of the age group 45 to 49 who were more likely to 
know about the programme. Also, women were slightly more likely to have heard of the EPWP than men, 
except in the age group 45 to 49.   
132. According to Table 3.6, just over a quarter of a million people report that they had participated in 
an EPWP programme in the six months prior to the survey.  This estimate seems too low given that more 
than 1 million work opportunities were provided by EPWP in the 2007/08 fiscal year (and thus one would 
expect about half a million people to have participated in EPWP in the six months prior to the survey).  
Table 3.6: Weighted number and percentage of respondents of working age that report that they have 
participated in an EPWP programme in the previous six months 
 Freq. Percent 
Yes 258,675 0.8 
No 9,321,715 28.5 
Do not know 755 0.0 
Not applicable 22,795,891 69.8 
Unspecified 284,119 0.9 
Total 32,661,155 100.00 
Source: own calculations on September 2007 Labour Force Survey, Statistics South Africa 
133. In Table 3.7, we break this down by age and gender. Almost 1% of working age men in 
comparison with only 0.7% of working age women report that they had participated in an EPWP project in 
the previous six months.  In keeping with the stated objective of targeting the youth (which in South Africa 
has come to mean persons under 35), the highest male participation rate was among the 30 to 34 year old 
group. Interestingly, for women the highest participation rate was among women aged 50 to 54. In the 
absence of panel data, it is impossible to know whether EPWP has an effect on subsequent labour market 
outcomes.  
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Table 3.7: Percentage of respondents of working age that report that they have participated in an EPWP 
programme in the previous six months, by age and gender 
Age group Male Female All 
15-19 0.15 0.13 0.14 
20-24 0.64 0.55 0.60 
25-29 0.98 0.67 0.82 
30-34 2.54 0.96 1.74 
35-39 0.58 1.14 0.87 
40-44 1.31 0.82 1.05 
45-49 1.28 0.80 1.02 
50-54 0.53 1.38 1.01 
55-59 0.79 0.89 0.84 
60-64 0.99 0.45 0.68 
All 0.95 0.72 0.84 
Source: own calculations on September 2007 Labour Force Survey, Statistics South Africa 
134. The September 2007 Labour Force Survey did not collect any household income or consumption 
data. Consequently, we are unable to assess whether EPWP is reaching poor households. Instead, we look 
at whether EPWP is reaching the less educated as a weak proxy for socio-economic status.  
Figure 3.1: Educational attainment of recent EPWP participants and non-participants 
 
Source: own calculations on September 2007 Labour Force Survey, Statistics South Africa 
135. Unexpectedly, we find that 33% of recent EPWP participants have completed high school (Grade 
12 or higher), which is the same proportion as in the non-participant population.  This runs counter to the 
stated objective a strategic EPWP document which identifies unskilled unemployed individuals who lack 
secondary education as the target group for temporary work and skills training (DPW EPWP Unit, 2006, 
cited in Hemson, 2007).  
136. The high uptake among the more educated is particularly surprising given the low wage rates of 
R30 to R50 per day that are typically offered by EPWP projects.  While work opportunities have been 
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increasing annually, the total wage bill has not kept pace. Under these conditions the income received per 
work opportunity has declined. Figure 3.2 shows that the total wage earned per “work opportunity” 
between 2004/05 and 2006/07 declined by 43% in real terms.  
Figure 3.2: Average total remuneration per “work opportunity” (in constant 2000 prices) 
 
Source: Hemson, 2007 
137. In summary, then, the current EPWP transfers fairly modest amounts of income into a relatively 
small number of households.  The EPWP II, however, aims to increase employment in labour-based 
initiatives to the equivalent of more than 400 000 jobs a year over the medium term (National Treasury, 
2009).  If the state has the capacity to implement the programme at this level of intensity, it has the 
potential to make a significant contribution to employment creation and poverty alleviation.  This will be 
particularly true if the programme is targeted via a mechanism other than a low wage rate.  
3.3 Social Assistance Grants 
138. Our discussion in Chapter 2 of money metric poverty and our income source decompositions 
highlighted the importance of social assistance grants as a source of income for many households in South 
Africa. The extensive network of social grants is central to anti-poverty policy in South Africa.  Some 
aspects of this system were inherited from the pre-democratic era; however, the post-Apartheid state has 
been very active in reforming and adding to this system. There has been a rapid expansion in spending on 
social assistance over the last between 2000/01 and 2006/07. While spending on most budget items (e.g. 
education and health) have remained fairly constant in real terms, consolidated expenditure on welfare and 
social assistance has increased from R30.1 billion (3.2 per cent of GDP) in 2000/01 to R101.4 billion (4.4 
per cent of GDP) in 2008/09 (National Treasury, 1998 and 2009).14  This is shown in Figure 3.3 below.  By 
April 2009, 13.4 million people were benefiting from social grants. Of these, 2.3 million were receiving 
old age pensions, 1.4 million were receiving disability grants and 9.1 million children were benefiting from 
Child Support Grants.  Social assistance as a percentage of GDP declined very slightly between 2006/07 
and 2008/09.  While expenditure on this item grew by 21% in nominal terms, this was a period of strong 
growth with GDP increasing by 32% in nominal terms. The number of grant beneficiaries has been 
growing slowly and the size of payments has not been increased much beyond inflation.  
                                                     
14 This figure includes social grants administration and welfare services such as old-age homes and drug treatment 
centres. If only direct cash transfers to households are considered, these account for an estimated 3.5% of GDP in 
2009/10.  
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Figure 3.3: Expenditure items as percentage of GDP 
 
Source: National Treasury, various years 
139. At the time of the transition to democracy, the South African social security system was already 
notably well developed for a middle income country (Lund, 1993, Van der Berg, 1997; Case & Deaton, 
1996) and the system has expanded markedly since then. At 4.4 per cent of GDP, spending on social 
assistance is three times higher than the median spending of 1.4 per cent of GDP across developing and 
transition economies (World Bank, 2009). 
140. The major grant types consist of the State Old Age Pension, the Disability Grant, the Child 
Support Grant and the Foster Care Grant. In this chapter we briefly describe the grants and the extent of 
their coverage before going on to illustrate their significance in reducing poverty. The main data source in 
this chapter is the 2008 NIDS data. 
3.3.1 Child grants 
141. The Child Support Grant (CSG) was introduced in 1998.  Prior to this, there was a State 
Maintenance Grant which was available to a parent or guardian living with a child under eighteen years of 
age if the applicant was unmarried, widowed or separated; had been deserted by their spouse for more than 
six months; had a spouse who received a social grant or had been declared unfit to work for more than six 
months; or had a spouse who was in prison, a drug treatment centre or similar institution for more than six 
months. Applicants had to prove that they had made efforts to apply for private maintenance from the other 
parent but been unsuccessful in doing so. There were several conditions attached to receipt of the grant, 
including ensuring that school-age children were in school. There were limitations not only on non-
parents’ receipt of the grant, but also on eligibility in respect of children born outside of marriage. As a 
result of significant differences in both rules and how the rules were applied, very few African children and 
their caregivers received the grant.  In 1990, only 0.2% of African children were in receipt of State 
Maintenance Grants, while 1.5% of white children, 4.0% of Indian children and 4.8% of Coloured children 
received the grant (Kruger, 1998)  It became apparent in the mid-1990s that providing equal access to State 
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Maintenance Grant benefits would have severe fiscal implications given poverty levels and household 
structures, with simulations based on household survey data predicting a more than twenty-fold increase in 
expenditures (Haarman and Haarman, 1996).   
142. In December of 1995, the democratically elected government of South Africa established the 
Lund Committee in order to evaluate the existing system of state support and to explore new alternative 
policy options targeting children and families. The report of the Committee recommended a new strategy 
to replace the existing State Maintenance Grant. This strategy included a child-linked grant with a lower 
monetary value than that of the State Maintenance Grant, but targeted at a wider group of beneficiaries, 
particularly those living in the most disadvantaged areas: rural areas and informal settlements. 
143. The Child Support Grant was introduced in April 1998, at a level of R100 per month for each 
child younger than seven years of age. The money was to be paid to the primary caregiver of the child.  
Applicants for the grant were required to pass a means test (based on household income), produce certain 
documents, and demonstrate efforts to secure funds from other sources.  The strict nature of the 
requirements prevented many genuine caregivers of in-need children from applying for the grant, and in 
June 1999 the rules were changed.  The means test was changed to make use of “personal income” (see 
below) rather than household income and the requirements to produce documents and other evidence 
became less onerous. 
144. When the Child Support Grant was introduced it was intended to cover the poorest 30% of 
children and was means-tested, i.e. the child had to be residing in a household with a household income 
below a certain threshold. The threshold was set at R800 per month for households living in urban areas 
and at R1100 per month for those living in rural areas or in informal settlements. In 1999, due to a low 
take-up rate, the (then) Department of Welfare altered the income test from a household based measure to 
one which considered only the income of the primary caregiver plus that of his/her spouse (net of other 
state transfers). The means test remained unchanged in nominal terms between 1998 and 2008.  In October 
2008, the means test was changed to be ten times the value of the grant and will thus automatically 
increase as the grant amount rises.  At the time of writing, the value of the Child Support Grant is R240 per 
month and thus the means test threshold is R2400 per month. 15   
145. The government has increased the age limit for eligibility in recent years. In April 2003 the age 
limit was raised to nine years old and a year later this was increased to eleven years. In April 2005 the age 
limit was raised to fourteen and in January 2008 to fifteen (i.e. children between the ages of zero and 
fourteen are eligible – a child becomes ineligible on her fifteenth birthday).   
146. When the Child Support Grant was introduced, it included several conditionalities. Applicants 
were initially expected to participate in “development programmes” and to have proof that the children for 
whom they were applying were immunised. The requirement in respect of development programmes was 
dropped after it became obvious that such programmes simply did not exist in many areas. The 
requirement in respect of immunisation was dropped out of recognition that it often discriminated against 
children who were already disadvantaged in terms of access to services. 
3.3.2 Other child grants  
147. There are two other child grants which have been in existence since before the Child Support 
Grant was established. Both have seen marked increases in take-up over recent years. This can be partly 
                                                     
15 Means testing for married caregivers doubles the mean test threshold and adds the spouse’s income to the caregiver’s 
income. Before October 2008, the mean test level was not adjusted for married couples. 
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attributed to an increase in general awareness of grants, but is also related to the HIV/AIDS pandemic as 
both grants are used in some cases to provide for children affected or infected by AIDS. 
148. The foster child grant (FCG) is paid to those who have gone through a court process to become 
registered as foster parents of the child.  The grant is intended for children up to the age of 18 years that are 
“in need of care” and who are not receiving such care from their biological parents. This includes children 
who are abused as well as children in trouble with the law. The grant is not primarily intended to deal with 
poverty, and thus has no means test. The value of the grant, R680 per month, is more than double the size 
of the Child Support Grant.  
149. The care dependency grant (CDG) is given to caregivers of children who are severely disabled to 
the extent that they need full-time care, i.e. if such care were not available in the home, the child would 
need to be institutionalised. The grant is available for children from one to 18 years. Officially, any child 
who attends a school, even if the school is for disabled children, is disqualified from receiving the grant. In 
practice, in at least one province this condition is not observed (Budlender & Woolard, 2006).  The grant is 
sometimes awarded in respect of children who are ill with AIDS. 
3.3.3 Profile of recipients of child grants 
150. Administrative data (SASSA, special request) indicates that as at April 2009, 9.5 million of the 
14 million children under the age of 15 in South Africa were in receipt of the Child Support Grant, Foster 
Care Grant of Care Dependency Grant.  The estimate of the number of children benefiting from child 
grants in the 2008 NIDS data is 8.6 million which is very slightly lower than the actual number of 
recipients in April 2008, namely 8.7 million.  
151. The purpose of child social assistance is to reach children in need, and one of the most at risk 
segments of the child population is orphans. Figure 3.4 below indicates how many orphans under the age 
of 15 are currently receiving social assistance according to the NIDS data.16 What is most striking is the 
high number of paternal orphans receiving grants, particularly the Child Support Grant, and the low 
number of maternal orphans receiving grants. This concurs with evidence found in Case, Hosegood and 
Lund (2004) that the probability of a child receiving a grant decreases when the mother is absent. The same 
conclusion is drawn by Woolard et al. (2005) using the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamic Study (KIDS) 
data. 
152. Children living with their widowed fathers are the least likely to be receiving grants. 
Unsurprisingly, orphans who have lost both parents are the most likely to be receiving the foster care grant. 
What is unexpected though is the fact that, aside from paternal orphans, orphans are less likely to be 
receiving the Child Support Grant than children with both parents. This may be a result of the more 
complex documentation required without the child’s mother as caregiver. 
                                                     
16 Unfortunately there is no information on grant receipt in children over the age of 15. 
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Figure 3.4: Percentage of children receiving social assistance, by orphanhood status 
 
Source: own calculations on NIDS data, 2008 
153. Two main issues for the effectiveness of the Child Support Grant remain children in need who 
are not receiving it and ineligible children/adults who are receiving it in error. Figure 3.5 below illustrates 
the difference by age between the number of children reported by the South African Social Security 
Agency (SASSA) and by NIDS. The two trend lines show broadly similar trends across ages.  
Figure 3.5: Number of children receiving Child Support Grants 
 
Source: NIDS, 2008 and SASSA, special request 
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154. Among those reporting receipt of a grant there could also be children who should not be 
receiving it. We did a simple simulation to estimate how many children were eligible to receive the Child 
Support Grant (CSG) based on the means test and the age eligibility criteria. Table 3.8 below compares our 
estimates of CSG-eligibility with the number of respondents reporting receipt of any form of child grant. 
The simulation suggests that a surprisingly small number of children who are not eligible are receiving the 
grant. 
Table 3.8: Comparison of eligibility and self-reported receipt of the grant 
Grant reported 
No grant 
reported Eligible for CSG 
(simulation) CSG FCG CDG Unknown Total 
Yes 6 526 566 200 428 49 937 2 535 556 360 822 9 673 309 
No 142 454 31 264 861 1 727 001 155 455 2 057 035 
Unknown 1 175 756 25 000 6 879 698 483 115 486 2 021 604 
Total 7 844 776 256 692 57 677 4 961 040 631 763 13 751 948 
155. Of greater concern, there appear to be 2.5 million children in need who are not receiving the 
grant. Of these, 1.9 million have never applied for a grant. The reasons given for not having applied are 
listed in Figure 3.6 below. The most common reason for not applying when eligible was stated as a lack of 
correct documentation. This has been a problem throughout the history of the Child Support Grant and was 
cited as the most common cause of non-application in the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) 
survey of 2004, although the percentage of respondents citing this problem has decreased a lot. Figure 3.7 
below illustrates the prevalence of the two most cited reasons for non-application by age. It is apparent that 
documentation is the most pressing issue in the younger ages and high income in the older ages. This is to 
be expected as caregivers often delay document application when a child is born or have to wait many 
months to receive it when they do. This suggests that poverty alleviation efforts would be enhanced by 
increased ease of documentation. The Department of Home Affairs and the Department of Social 
Development have recognized this and are trying to implement enhanced processes.  For example, if an 
applicant can prove that she has attempted (and failed) to get an identity document for herself and/or an 
birth certificate for the child, it is now possible for the grant to be processed in the interim.  Under these 
circumstances, the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) will then liaise with Home Affairs to 
provide the necessary documentation.  According to DSD officials, about 8000 people have availed 
themselves of this process to date (personal communication, Thabo Rakoloti, 4 March 2010).   
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Figure 3.6: Main reason grant was not applied for 
 
Source: NIDS, 2008 
Figure 3.7: Main reason grant was not applied for by age 
 
Source: NIDS, 2008 
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156. As discussed above, the means test income threshold was adjusted substantially upwards in 
October 2008. Figure 3.8 below illustrates the number of children eligible under the new and old means 
test levels by age. Under the new means test, we estimate that there are an additional 1.7 million children 
now considered eligible for the grant, an increase of 21%.  
Figure 3.8: Simulated number of eligible children under the different means tests 
 
Source: NIDS, 2008 
157. In the NIDS data, the majority (82%) of the recipients of the Child Support Grant are reported as 
the child’s parents. Another 12% are reported as the child’s grandparents. Roughly 16% of caregivers 
receiving social assistance for children are not co-resident with them, which is in contravention of the 
regulations17. The vast majority of these non-resident grant recipients are the child’s parents. This figure is 
similar to that derived from KIDS 2004 which estimated the incidence of non-resident Child Support Grant 
recipients at 10% (Woolard, Carter & Aguero, 2005). 
3.3.4 Social assistance for the elderly  
158. The State Old Age Pension was originally introduced in South Africa in 1928 to address poverty 
among elderly white people, but was gradually extended to other population groups. During the Apartheid 
years both the size of the grant and some of the conditions discriminated on the basis of race. Figure 3.9 
shows how the value of the State Old Age Pension has changed over time.  In 1970, the size of the State 
Old Age Pension for a white person was more than seven times the value of the pension for an African.  
This gap narrowed rapidly to a ratio of just over three in 1980, partly through a reduction in the real value 
of a white pension, but also through real increases in the size of the pension to Africans. The 1992 Social 
Assistance Act finally did away with all racially discriminatory provisions. 
                                                     
17  In order to be deemed co-resident a caregiver must reside in the same household as the child for at least 4 
nights a week. 
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Figure 3.9 Annual value of the State Old Age Pension in constant 2009 prices, by race 
 
Source: Data prior to 1995 from Servaas van der Berg (personal communication); data from 1995 to 2008 from National Treasury 
(various years) 
159. The State Old Age Pension is available to women at the age of 60 years and to men at the age of 
61 years. (Until 2007, men only qualified for the Old Age Pension at age 65 but this gender discrimination 
has been gradually phased out. From April 2010, the ages will be equalised at age 60). The State Old Age 
Pension is subject to a means test which is based on the income and assets of the applicant and his/her 
spouse (if the applicant is married). Unlike the Child Support Grant, which is paid at a flat rate, the State 
Old Age Pension and disability grant have a sliding scale at the upper end of income eligibility where the 
amount of the grant is progressively reduced for each additional rand of income. At the time of writing the 
maximum amount of the grant was R1010 which is slightly more than double the per capita income of the 
African population. More than 80 percent of the elderly receive the pension. According to our estimates 
based on survey data, more than two-thirds of the recipients are women because they go into payment 
slightly earlier than men, are more likely to be eligible (as are less likely to have private employer-based 
pensions) and have a longer life expectancy. 
3.3.5 The impact of the grants on poverty  
160. Given this extensive reach and the importance of these grants in the budget, it is important to 
establish whether the grants have strong anti-poverty impacts. Table 3.9 shows the percentage of 
households that report that social grants are their main source of income. Prior to the introduction of the 
Child Support Grant, the major sources of grant income were the Old Age Pension and the Disability 
Grant. Because the value of these grants is large, access to either of these grants was sufficient to raise the 
per capita income of all but the largest households out of the bottom quintile. Consequently, in the 2002 
data it can be observed that grants were twice as likely to be the main source of income in the second and 
third quintile than in the bottom quintile. By 2005, however, the Child Support Grant (of much lower 
monetary value than the Old Age Pension or Disability Grant) was reaching more than 5.5 million children 
in about 3.5 million households. In spite of the low value of this new grant, by 2005 we observe a 
substantial number of households in the bottom decile reporting some form of grant income as their main 
source of income. 
161. The rapid roll-out of the Child Support Grant from 2000 onwards is clearly discerned in Table 
3.10. Whereas in 1997 just under one-third of households were receiving a grant, by 2007 this proportion 
had risen to about one-half. Most significantly, the percentage of households in the bottom quintile with 
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access to social assistance rose from 16% to 69% between 1997 and 2006.  (It should be noted that the 
2007 data from which the quintiles are constructed is cruder than in previous years and thus the 2007 data 
is not strictly comparable with the earlier years).   
Table 3.9: Percentage of households reporting grants as their main source of income, by quintile 
Quintile 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1 16.1 16.9 21.4 39.6 47.7 
2 31.4 36.1 44.0 49.5 51.0 
3 31.1 34.0 42.2 38.1 34.5 
4 18.1 19.5 16.7 14.3 16.0 
5 4.4 4.2 3.5 2.8 2.5 
Total 18.2 19.6 21.5 28.9 30.4 
Source: Own calculations using 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 General Household Surveys, Statistics South Africa 
Table 3.10: Percentage of households reporting any income from grants 
Quintile 1997 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
1 15.9 32.0 31.7 40.2 47.7 69.4 
2 54.0 55.8 50.9 71.2 73.3 69.9 
3 46.7 51.6 53.2 67.1 69.1 69.4 
4 33.8 33.2 34.8 35.8 40.1 45.4 
5 14.0 11.3 7.9 8.8 10.0 12.0 
Total 32.9 36.8 32.0 38.6 45.5 55.2 
Source: Own calculations using 1997 October Household Survey and 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 General Household Surveys, 
Statistics South Africa 
162. Table 3.11 looks at the percentage of households in each income quintile that received income 
from specific social grants in 2008. More than half of households in the bottom quintile receive some 
income from the Child Support Grant, in comparison with only 9% of households in the top quintile.  In 
keeping with the earlier finding that the size of the Old Age Pension is sufficient to lift many households 
out of the poorest quintile, households receiving the Old Age Pension are more likely to be in the second 
and third quintile rather than the very poorest quintile.   
Table 3.11: Percentage of households reporting income from social grants, by quintile 
Quintile % reporting any income from Child Grants 
% reporting any income 
from Disability Grant 
% reporting any income 
from Old Age Pension 
1 55.8% 5.7% 9.8% 
2 57.9% 10.9% 27.1% 
3 45.4% 14.7% 23.5% 
4 26.5% 9.9% 17.7% 
5 9.0% 2.8% 5.0% 
All 33.6% 8.2% 15.3% 
Source: NIDS, 2008 
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163. In Figure 3.10 we disaggregate household income sources by income quintile in order to 
highlight the role of social assistance grants in providing income support to the poorest households.  It is 
striking that fully two-thirds of income to the bottom quintile comes from social assistance grants, with 
most of this income coming from child grants (Child Support Grant, Foster Care Grant and Care 
Dependency Grant combined).  As households move up the income distribution, labour market income 
becomes increasingly important and reliance on social assistance is commensurately reduced. 
Figure 3.10: Sources of cash income, by quintile 
 
Source: NIDS, 2008 
3.4 The impact of social assistance grants on education, health and labour supply  
164. A number of studies have pointed to the importance of the grants beyond the direct monetary 
impact they have on poorer households.  In this section we briefly review some of this evidence.   
3.4.1 Impact on education 
165. In a relatively early paper which described the functioning of the social welfare system in South 
Africa and the various homelands that existed at that time, Lund (1993) notes that the Old Age Pension 
was generally regarded as a household resource in the three-generational households that were common in 
rural areas. Pensions were thus reported to be used for educational expenses, among others. May et al. 
(1998), reporting on the findings of South Africa’s participatory poverty assessment (PPA), found that the 
Pension was reported to be an important source of support for grandchildren, many of whom were living 
apart from their parents. Case and Deaton (1996), using data from the 1993 PSLSD, find that households 
with elderly members tend to spend less on transport and more on schooling than other households. 
166. Samson et al. (2001) have as their primary focus the relationship between social security and 
school enrolment among children of school-going age. The paper argues that pension income can increase 
school enrolments in two ways. The first is by assisting with covering school-related costs. The second is 
by reducing the opportunity cost of having the child in school instead of contributing to household income 
DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2010)1 
 64
through child labour. The authors find a positive and statistically significant effect of the Old Age Pension 
on school attendance rates, especially for girls.  
167. Case & Ardington (2006) investigate whether having a pensioner in the household reduces the 
negative impact of maternal orphanhood on schooling. They find that having a female pensioner mitigates 
the impact in respect of enrolment and progression, but does not do so in respect of school-related 
expenses. Having a male pensioner in the household has a significant negative effect on progression, and a 
negative, but not significant, effect on enrolment and school-related expenditure. 
168. Case et al. (2005) use data collected through the longitudinal demographic surveillance system 
(DSS) of the Africa Centre for Health and Population Studies in the Umkhanyakude District of KwaZulu-
Natal.  Receipt of the Child Support Grant was found to result in an 8.1 percentage point increase in school 
enrolment among 6-year olds, and a 1.8 percentage point increase among 7 year olds. The authors suggest 
several possible reasons for this pattern. Firstly, the Child Support Grant may improve children’s health 
and nutrition, and thus school-readiness. Secondly, the Child Support Grant, by increasing income, might 
allow the household to afford fees, uniform and other school-related expenses. Thirdly, it is possible that 
caregivers who are eager enough to apply for the Child Support Grant might also be those most eager to 
enrol their children in school (c.f. Agüero et al., 2008). Case and Ardington test this possibility by using 
older maternal siblings as a control group. They find that these children are less likely than average to be 
enrolled, thus contradicting the hypothesis that higher enrolment simply reflects more eager (or “efficient”) 
mothers. 
169. Boler & Timaeus (2006) find that the Child Support Grant helps to mitigate the negative 
educational impact of orphanhood on older children (those aged 13-16) despite the fact that the grant was 
only available to children under ten years at the time their survey data was collected. 
170. Hamoudi & Thomas’ (2005) use the 1998 Demographic and Health Survey to examine the 
impact of the pension on educational attainment of children. They look at children aged 6-19, and estimate 
total years of schooling based on current or last grade. They find that pension income has a greater 
beneficial impact on girls’ education than boys’ education. This accords with results of earlier analyses 
(such as Duflo, 2000), but adds the nuance that for older children (aged 13-19), a male pension tends to 
increase education among boys and decrease education among girls, whereas a female pension has little 
effect on either. Among younger children (aged 6-12), female pension has a positive effect on girls and 
negative or zero effect on boys. Further analysis shows that overall boys aged 6-15 who are co-resident 
with their mothers are further ahead in school than those who are not. However, boys living in Pension-
recipient households are likely to have gone less far in education if they are co-resident with mothers. The 
same pattern is found among girls, although not as marked.  The authors then explore these patterns further 
using KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) data from 1993 and 1998. They find that, after 
controlling for age and sex, children aged 6-19 in 1993 who five years later were co-resident with a 
pension-eligible individual already in 1993 had a quarter of a year more schooling, on average, than those 
who would not be co-resident. 
3.4.2 Impact on health 
171. There are several studies which focus on the health impact of grants. Case (2001a) investigates 
the impact of Old Age Pensions on health status. Her analysis is based on a 1999 stratified random sample 
of 300 households in the Langeberg health district of the Western Cape. This district includes a mix of 
African, white and coloured households. The study finds that Old Age Pension income is pooled in 84% of 
households. Where income is not pooled, beneficial health impacts are experienced only by the pensioner. 
Where income is pooled, children’s height is found to increase, suggesting a beneficial impact beyond the 
 DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2010)1 
 65
pensioner. The study suggests that this impact works partly through improved sanitation, partly through 
improved nutritional status, and partly through reduction in psychosocial stress. 
172. Case (2001b) - based on the same dataset - finds that the presence of a pensioner is associated 
with an increase of about five centimetres of children’s height for age after controlling for a range of 
household and individual factors. This is equivalent to about half a year’s growth for children aged zero to 
six. 
173. Duflo (2000) examines the extent to which allocating resources to women rather than to men 
affects the distributional outcome and, in particular, investments in children. Her study uses the 1993 
PSLSD data, and focuses on children aged 6-60 months. More than a quarter of African children of this 
age are found to live in the same household as an Old Age Pension recipient. The impact on children is 
measured through weight for height and height for age. The presence of a female pensioner results in an 
increase of both weight-for-age and health-for-age z-scores for girls but not for boys. There is also no 
significant effect on either girls or boys of having a male of eligible age in the household.  
174. Agüero et al. (2008) use data from the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) to test 
whether receipt of the Child Support Grant during the first 36 months of a child’s life has an impact on 
child health as measured by height-for-age. This variable is considered of interest for its own value and 
also as a proxy for other positive outcomes for children. The authors find that children who have received 
the Child Support Grant during the first three years of their life are likely to have significantly higher 
height-for-age than those who have not.   
175. Yamauchi (2005) uses data from all three rounds of the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study 
(KIDS) to explore the effect of early childhood nutrition on schooling inputs and outcomes, using height-
for-age z-score from the 1993 and 1998 rounds as a measure of health capital and nutritional status, and 
schooling decisions and outcome data from the 2004 round. The analysis suggests that an improvement in 
child health significantly lowers the age for starting school, increases the grade reached, and decreases 
grade repetition at the early stage of schooling.  
3.4.3 Impact on labour force participation  
176. Bertrand et al. (2000) investigate the impact of the Old Age Pension on the labour supply of other 
household members. Using the 1993 PSLSD data, the authors find a reduction in working hours of 
members of working age when another member of the household reaches pensionable age. The reduction is 
greater when the older person is a woman. Working age women tend to reduce their working hours less 
than working age men and eldest sons tends to reduce their working hours more than other members.  
177. Klasen and Woolard (2009) argue that access to state transfers results in the unemployed basing 
their location decisions on the availability of economic support rather than on the best location for 
employment search. Because a lot of economic support (specifically that provided by the elderly) is based 
in rural areas, this leads to reduced opportunities for job matching.  
178. Posel et al. (2004) use 1993 PSLSD data to examine the effect of receipt of the Old Age Pension 
on the labour supply of working-age African adults. Unlike Bertrand et al., they include both resident and 
non-resident household members in the analysis. This modification brings with it significantly different 
results. Posel et al. use a simple variable of labour market participation rather than hours worked, as the 
latter information is not available for migrants. Analysis is restricted to rural households. Like Bertrand et 
al., analysis is restricted to three-generation households.  They find that rural African women are 
significantly more likely to be migrant workers when they are members of a household in receipt of a 
pension, especially when the pension recipient is female. Labour migrants in age-eligible households are 
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slightly more likely to be female, to be more educated, and to be older than those in non-age-eligible 
households. The authors hypothesise that the reasons for the relationship between pension income and 
migration could be that the pension provides the means to migrate, and/or that the pension provides the 
means for the older person to care for the child/children of the migrant. 
3.5 Policy simulation exercise 
179. For the purposes of the simulation exercise, we use the NIDS micro-data to generate a simple 
microsimulation model of the two biggest grants, i.e. the Old Age Pension and the Child Support Grant. 
We focus exclusively on these two grants as these are the only two grants that are specifically aimed at 
poverty alleviation (albeit for targeted age groups). The other grants – such as the Disability Grant and the 
Foster Care Grant – are targeted at individuals that have particular circumstances that extend beyond 
poverty. In addition, only the Old Age Pension and Child Support Grant can easily be modelled as the 
eligibility rules are clearly defined based on age and income criteria that we have available in our survey 
data.   
180. For modelling purposes, we use two poverty lines (the R515 per capita lower line and R949 per 
capita upper line defined in the previous chapter) to identify the poor before poverty-alleviating grants, viz. 
The Old Age Pension and Child Support Grant. To calculate “before grant” income, we simply subtract the 
amount of Old Age Pension and Child Support Grant income that was reported by household members. We 
then simulate the impact of the Child Support Grant and Old Age Pension assuming that all those who are 
eligible for the grants are able to access the grant.   
Table 3.12: The poverty reduction effect of the OAP and CSG, using the lower poverty line 
Quintile (based on per 
capita income without 
OAP and CSG) 
% of individuals below 
lower poverty line 
(R515 per month) 
before OAP & CSG 
% of individuals below 
lower poverty line (R515 
per month) after OAP & 
CSG (as reported) 
% of individuals below 
lower poverty line (R515 
per month) after OAP & 
CSG (simulated eligibility) 
1 100% 97.0% 96.4% 
2 100% 91.7% 89.9% 
3 69.6% 51.2% 42.1% 
4 0% 0% 0% 
5 0% 0% 0% 
All 53.9% 48.0% 45.7% 
Source: NIDS, 2008 
Table 3.13: The poverty reduction effect of the OAP and CSG, using the higher poverty line 
Quintile (based on per 
capita income without 
of OAP and CSG) 
% of individuals below 
upper poverty line 
(R949 per month) 
before OAP & CSG 
% of individuals below 
upper poverty line (R949 
per month) after OAP & 
CSG (as reported) 
% of individuals below 
upper poverty line (R949 
per month) after OAP & 
CSG (simulated 
eligibility) 
1 100% 99.7% 99.5% 
2 100% 99.0% 99.0% 
3 100% 98.1% 97.4% 
4 41.1% 35.5% 31.4% 
5 0 % 0% 0% 
All 68.2% 66.5% 65.4% 
Source: NIDS, 2008 
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181. It is clear from Tables 3.12 and 3.13 that the simulation results are quite sensitive to the choice of 
poverty line.  At the lower poverty line, income from the OAP and CSG is sufficient to lift even some of 
the very poorest households (in quintile 1) out of poverty.  At the higher poverty line, the modest size of 
the social grants coupled with the dilution effect of sharing this across large households means that the 
impact is less marked.  
182. These results are broadly consistent with the results reported in Table 2.15 which showed the 
impact of all grants and not just the Old Age Pension and Child Support Grant as is done here.  
183. Not only do the grants have a significant impact on poverty (at the lower poverty line) but they 
also make a significant impact on inequality.  We find that the Gini coefficient on “pre-grant” income is 
0.03 higher than when calculated on either reported income or simulated income. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
184. Chapter 1 began by gathering the evidence to show that the long-run development trajectory in 
South Africa has been one that has generated a very high-inequality society with a strong racial component 
to this inequality. The bottom half of the income distribution was reserved for black South Africans and, at 
any of a wide range of poverty lines, poverty was dominated by black South Africans. Historically this was 
the result of active racial privileging and discrimination in state policy. Even without the direct racial 
interventions in the labour market such as the reservation of jobs that took place under Apartheid, the racial 
biases in determining where people were allowed to live and in the education, health and social services 
policy matrix would have created a workforce with racially skewed human capital and spatial 
characteristics. Such spatial and human capital legacies leave a very long-run footprint and these processes 
are hard to reverse. They should not have been expected to disappear at the dawning of democratic 
government in South Africa.  In Chapter 2, we drew on the large pool of post-1993 survey data up to the 
just recently released data from 2008 to show that these factors have continued to exert an influence on 
South Africa’s development path.  It is not just the case that the 15 years since the democratic transition is 
not enough time for these factors to work their ways out of South African society: it is a much more 
dynamic and daunting process than this. 
185. While we observe a decline in the importance of between-race inequality, within-race inequality 
has risen sharply and this has been strong enough to stop South Africa’s aggregate inequality from falling. 
It should be noted that while the between-race component of inequality has fallen, it remains remarkably 
high by international norms and its decline has slowed since the mid 1990s. Moreover, the bottom deciles 
of the income distribution and the poverty profile are still dominated by Africans and racial income shares 
are far from proportionate with population shares. Nonetheless, South Africa’s changing population shares 
imply that a policy focus on race-based redistribution will become increasingly limited in the future as the 
foundation for further broad-based social development.  
186. South Africa has chosen to allocate significant resources to direct redistributive policies with the 
dual objectives of providing short-term income support to the poor and breaking the intergenerational 
transmission of poverty by encouraging households to invest in better health, education and nutrition for 
their children. Chapter 3 sketched out some of the key elements of South Africa’s social safety net system, 
namely the existence of short-term unemployment insurance for those with formal labour market 
experience; a public works programme that seeks to provide income support and skills development to an 
increasing proportion of the long-term unemployed who are outside of the contributory unemployment 
insurance system; and an extensive arrangement of non-contributory social assistance grants that directly 
benefit more than one-quarter of South Africans. It needs to be emphasized however that the grants are 
specifically targeted at the elderly, the disabled and children.  In our analysis of the Child Support Grant 
we highlighted the importance of improving the vital registration system in order to get children into 
payment sooner. 
187. Most of the unemployed are unable to access unemployment benefits but are not provided for in 
the social assistance system which remains premised on the notion that unemployment is a temporary 
condition.  Consequently there are many that argue that the social grant system should be extended to focus 
directly on the unemployed. While strong economic growth supported the growth in the grants in the first 
fifteen years of democracy, we would argue that it is imprudent to argue for permanent income support for 
the unemployed. Many of the unemployed are young school leavers and while they clearly need some sort 
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of social safety net or temporary social insurance, the longer term goal has to be directed at assimilation 
into the labour market. In section 3.4 of this chapter, we presented a brief review of the body of literature 
which shows that the existing grant system seems to be promoting desirable education and health 
behaviours. This is true even though these grants are unconditional. Yet, the ultimate return to these 
positive human capital outcomes is an ability to become a productive citizen in the country. Again this 
turns on a more virtuous interaction with the labour market than we currently witness.   
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ANNEX I: DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
188. Three nationally representative sample surveys were used as the basis for the analysis in this 
report. These data sets present socio-economic snapshots of South Africa in 1993, 2000 and 2008. In this 
annex we describe these data sets.  This complements the detailed discussion of the comparability of the 
income from the three data sets that is presented in section 2.1 of the report. The 1993 and 2000 data sets 
have been publicly available and widely used for a number of years. Therefore, our commentary on these 
data sets will be very brief.  The 2008 data are new, having been released to the public at the end of July 
2009. This is the first report to use these data for inequality and poverty comparisons over time.  Therefore, 
our description of this data set is more extensive. 
189. There is good baseline information to provide the data for monitoring changes in South Africa 
since the democratic transition.  The empirical analysis in the report utilises a survey undertaken in late 
1993 as part of the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD) by the Southern 
Africa Labour and Development Research Unit at the University of Cape Town with technical expertise 
given by the World Bank.  The 1993 PSLSD survey was intended to give a broad picture of living 
standards and poverty for the whole of South Africa.  It made use of a detailed questionnaire covering 
various aspects of the household's economic activities and social attributes.  Data were collected for 40 284 
individuals in 8 848 households in 358 census enumerator districts countrywide.  Of these, 73.8 % were 
classified as African, 7.8% as Coloured, 2.9% as Indian and 1367 13.5% as White. When weighted up to 
population totals this represents 38 118 616 individuals from 8 530 808 households with the respective 
racial percentages being 77.0%, 8.1%, 2.6% and 12.3%. 
190. These data as well as questionnaires and all supporting documentation are available from 
http://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za/catalogue/catalog_overview.php?id=zaf-datafirst-pslsd-1993-v2.0 
191. The Income and Expenditure Survey is conducted every five years, with the primary purpose of 
collecting the expenditure data required to calculate the weights for the Consumer Price Index.  Data on 
expenditure on approximately 1000 goods and services is collected, in addition to detailed income data.  
The 2000 Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) was conducted concurrently with the September 2000 
Labour Force Survey (LFS). The same sample was used for both surveys.  The two surveys can thus be 
linked, thereby creating an extremely rich data-set. Ten dwelling units were sampled in each of 3000 
Primary Sampling Units (usually an EA or a combination of EAs if the EA was too small).  Out of this 
sample of 30 000 households, 26 265 households participated in the 2000 IES.  There are some difficulties 
with this data-set (see Simkins, 2005).  The data is available on request from Statistics South Africa 
(www.statssa.gov.za).  
192. The analysis of the IES used in this report reflects data from 101 679 100 individuals in 25 973 
households and from 2 959 census enumerator districts countrywide.  Of these, 81.2 % were classified as 
African, 11.1% as Coloured, 2.0% as Indian and 5.7% as White. When weighted up to population totals 
this represents 42 237 374 individuals from 104 182 89 households with the respective racial percentages 
being 79.3%, 9.1%, 2.6% and 9.0%. 
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193. The 2008 National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) is the first national panel study of 
individuals of all ages in South Africa. Sampling was undertaken by Statistics South Africa. A two-stage 
cluster sample design was employed in drawing the sample.  The target population for NIDS was private 
households in all nine provinces of South Africa, and residents in workers’ hostels, convents and 
monasteries. In order to get a nationally representative sample for NIDS from the Master Sample of PSUs, 
the sample was allocated to the provinces with probability proportional to size.  This allocation was applied 
to ensure that the sample was spread throughout the country and not concentrated in some provinces. 
194. The fieldwork for Wave 1 commenced in the last week of January 2008 and ended in July 2008. 
Response rates at the end of this phase were disappointing, especially in traditionally high income areas. 
Given the importance of including households from across the income distribution in the base wave, it was 
decided to embark on additional fieldwork. The second phase was conducted from September 2008 until 
early December 2008.   
195. In the combined Phase 1 and Phase 2 samples from Wave 1, 10368 dwellings were selected to be 
approached to take part in NIDS. Of those dwelling units, 491 (4.5%) were found to be multi-household 
dwellings. Of the 10859 eligible households, 7 305 agreed to participate. Within the participating 
households, 31 170 individuals were identified as household members. However, 2915 people were not 
resident members and were thus excluded from the study. All these sample members, including children, 
are continuing sample members and will be re-interviewed in 2010 and in subsequent waves.  After the 
fieldwork, the NIDS sample weights were adjusted to reflect the age-sex-race and provincial distributions 
of the 2008 mid-year population estimates produced by Stats SA.  
196. In sum then, the 2008 wave of the NIDS survey provides the baseline information on the 
wellbeing of 28 255 sample members in 7 305 households from 400 census enumeration districts. Of these 
78.6% were classified as African, 14.8% as Coloured, 1.6% as Asian/Indian and 5.1% as white. When 
weighted up to population totals this represents 48 442 116 individuals from 13 722 918 households with 
the respective racial percentages being 79.4%, 8.9%, 2.6% and 9.1%. 
197. The NIDS data as well as questionnaires and all supporting documentation are available off the 
NIDS website (http://www.nids.uct.ac.za/home/). A detailed description of the process of questionnaire 
design, sampling, fieldwork and data cleaning is provided in Leibbrandt, Woolard and De Villiers (2009). 
The technical details with regard to the derivation of the weights are provided in Wittenberg (2009). 
 
198. A full description of the derivation of household per capita income variable is given in Argent 
(2009). This technical paper includes an analysis of response rates on income questions that, generally, 
records very low non-response. It then goes on to describe the methods used to impute missing individual 
incomes in order to aggregate individual incomes into total household income. Section 7 of Finn et al. 
(2009) compares this derived household per capita income variable to the equivalent derived household 
expenditure variable. A close correlation between income and expenditure is reported with household 
income generally exceeding household expenditure. Figure 3 of Finn, Leibbrandt and Woolard (2009) 
compares income and expenditure shares across population deciles and shows a near identical inequality 
picture. 
199. A common criticism of existing South African datasets is that they do not include enough detail 
across multiple areas of interest to allow for certain types of analysis. For example, those with detailed 
information on labour do not include enough detail on income, or health, or education for some types of 
analysis to be possible. Since the linkages between these topics have proven to be important, a particular 
strength of the 2008 NIDS dataset is that it includes detailed information across many different areas.  For 
example, information was collected on: 
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• Income and expenditures of the household and the individuals in the household; 
• The assets owned by the household and the services to which the household has access; 
• The level of education and health status of household members; 
• Whether household members are still in school, working, looking for work or helping at home or 
retired; and 
• The community groups to which members of the household belong, whether household members 
would like to remain within their current communities and how well-off they are relative to others 
in their community. 
 
200. As the panel unfolds, it will reveal the dynamic structure of households in South Africa, and 
changes in the living conditions and well-being of household members. However, in this report, the NIDS 
data are used to provide a nationally representative picture of contemporary South Africa. 
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ANNEX II: A DECOMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD LABOUR MARKET INCOME 
201. In order to better understand the mechanism whereby employment affects inequality, Leibbrandt, 
Woolard and Woolard (2009) make use of a decomposition technique to unpack the earned (i.e. wage and 
self-employment) income component of household income. They begin by recognizing that household 
labour market income depends on three factors, namely, the number of “potential workers” (that is, 
household members of working age), the number of household members that are actually employed and 
the earnings of these workers. They slightly modify Glewwe (1986) in order to decompose the log-
variance of household labour market earnings into these three components: 
wp
wp
L
W
L
L
hhsize
L
hhsize
W ••=  
where W is labour market income from both wage and self-employment (for simplicity we call it 
merely ‘wage income’), hhsize is household size, Lp is the potential number of workers (defined here as the 
number of persons aged 15-64) and LW  is the number of people actually employed. 
202. Taking the natural logarithm of both sides of the equation above and calculating the variance 
gives: 
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203. The contribution of each of the first three terms on the right-hand-side can be thought of as the 
contribution of household composition (the number of persons of working age), access to employment and 
wage inequality, respectively.  
204. Table A.1.5 reveals that most of the inequality in shared household earnings is the result of 
unequal wage incomes, rather than the fraction of household members that are of working age or who are 
actually working. Nevertheless, joblessness has a significant effect on household wage inequality. This is 
particularly true in African households.  
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Table A.2.1: Decomposition of shared household earnings 
 Variances Covariances 
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All 
Households 7.4% 12.6% 69.4% 2.4% 4.4% 3.6% 
White 
Households 9.5% 12.6% 90.7% -1.2% -1.6% -10.0% 
African 
Households 8.7% 15.0% 64.8% 3.8% 5.2% 2.6% 
Source: Own calculations based on September 2006 Labour Force Survey, Statistics South Africa. The percentage contribution to 
earnings inequality is shown in parentheses. 
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ANNEX III: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table A.3.1: Variables in the 2008 data 
Variable Explanation Inclusion Category 
w1_fwag Main and secondary job yes wages 
w1_cwag Casual wages yes wages 
w1_swag Self employment income yes wages 
w1_cheq 13th Cheque yes wages 
w1_bonu Other bonus yes wages 
w1_prof Profit share yes wages 
w1_help 'Helping friends' income yes wages 
w1_extra Extra piece-rate income yes wages 
w1_spen Old age pension yes government
w1_dis Disability grant yes government
w1_chld Child grant yes government
w1_fost Foster care grant yes government
w1_care Care dependency grant yes government
w1_uif UIF income yes government
w1_comp Workmen's compensation yes government
w1_indi Interest/dividend income yes capital 
w1_rnt Rental income yes capital 
w1_ppen Private pensions and annuities yes capital 
w1_inhe Inheritance no  
w1_retr Retrenchment payments no  
w1_brid Lobola/bride wealth payments no  
w1_gift Gift income no  
w1_loan Repayment of loans no  
w1_sale Sale of household goods no  
w1_othe Other income no  
w1_remt Inter-household remittances yes remitt 
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Variables in the 2000 data 
Variable Explanation Inclusion Category 
 ALL regular income (P2401Q*)   
P2401Q0101 Salaries and wages Yes wages 
P2401Q0102 Bonuses and income Yes wages 
P2401Q0103 Commission and director's fees Yes wages 
P2401Q0104 Part-time work and cash allowances Yes wages 
P2401Q02 Net profit Yes wages 
P2401Q0301 Net income from letting of fixed property Yes capital 
P2401Q0302 Other Yes other 
P2401Q04 Royalties Yes capital 
P2401Q05 Interest received Yes capital 
P2401Q06 Dividends on shares Yes capital 
P2401Q0701 Pension resulting from your employment Yes capital 
P2401Q0702 Annuity and similar recurring receipts Yes capital 
P2401Q070301 Social pension or allowances Yes government
P2401Q070302 Disability grants Yes government
P2401Q070303 Family and other allowances Yes government
P2401Q0704 From the workmen's compensation Yes government
P2401Q08 Alimony, maintenance and similar allowances Yes remitt 
P2401Q09 Regular allowances from family members Yes remitt 
 Other income (P2402Q*)   
P2402Q01 Net from hobbies, side-lines, part-time activities Yes wages 
P2402Q0201 Sale of vehicles No  
P2402Q0202 Sale of fixed property No  
P2402Q0203) Sale of other personal property, second hand goods No  
P2402Q03 Payments from boarders and other hh members Yes other 
P2402Q0401 Housing from empl (incl subsidy, red rent, red int) Yes wages 
P2402Q0402 Transport from empl (incl red train/air fares...) Yes wages 
P2402Q0403 Empl contrib - pension, provident, medical, annuity  No  
P2402Q0404 Other from empl Yes wages 
P2402Q0501 Lump sums before retirement No  
P2402Q0502 Endowment policies and other similar lump sums No  
P2402Q0503 Lump sums from workmens compensation, UIF No  
P2402Q0504 Life insure and inheritances received No  
P2402Q0601 Funeral funds No  
P2402Q0602 Damage to fixed property No  
P2402Q0603 Road traffic collisions No  
P2402Q0604 Other gratuities No  
P2402Q07 Stokvel No  
P2402Q0801 Withdrawal from savings No  
P2402Q0802 Non-refundable bursaries Yes* other 
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P2402Q0803 Benefits, donations from welfare funds, the govt No  
P2402Q0804 Cash (including bonuses from buying associations) No  
P2402Q0805 Value of food received Yes remitt 
P2402Q0806 Value of housing (other than employer) Yes remitt 
P2402Q0807 Value of clothing (other than employer) Yes remitt 
P2402Q0808) Other benefits, donations, gifts etc No  
P2402Q09 Lobola/dowry No  
P2402Q10 All other income (e.g. From gambling, lotto…) No  
P2402Q11 All other income not elsewhere specified No  
 
Variables in the 1993 data 
Variable Explanation Inclusion Category 
imprent Implied rental income no  
farmrent Renting out farm land yes capital 
liverent Renting out grazing land for livestock yes capital 
rentinc Rental income yes capital 
totm_rec Remittance income yes remitt 
hhnwage Net wage income yes wages 
travwage Travel allowance yes wages 
foodwage Food allowance yes wages 
homewage Housing allowance yes wages 
hhc1wage Casual wage yes wages 
foodcw1 Casual food allowance yes wages 
bencw1 Casual benefits yes wages 
hhc2wage Casual wage 2 yes wages 
foodcw2 Casual food allowance 2 yes wages 
bencw2 Casual benefits 2 yes wages 
agincome Agricultural income no  
agsubsid Agricultural subsidy no  
profit31 Self-employment yes wages 
 Other income (otherinc)   
spen Old age pension Yes govt 
ppen Private pension Yes capital 
gppen Govt civil service pen Yes capital 
dis Disability grant Yes govt 
pov Government poor relief Yes govt 
comp Workmen's compensation Yes govt 
indi Interest and dividends Yes capital 
uif UIF Yes govt 
ngo ngo food or meal Yes other 
ngo2 other ngo transfers Yes other 
gsfs govet supplementary food scheme Yes govt 
othe Other Yes other 
DELSA/ELSA/WD/SEM(2010)1 
 78
 
Table A.3.2: Income overview 
  1993 
Income 
share/Pop. 
share 
2000 
Income 
share/Pop. 
Share 
2008 
Income 
share/Pop. 
share 
1993 
Mean 
1993 
Median
2000 
Mean
2000 
Median 
2008 
Mean 
2008 
Median 
African 0.47 0.54 0.56 539 304 762 360 816 367 
Coloured 0.92 1.03 0.94 1072 795 1443 816 1381 800 
Indian 1.88 1.98 2.90 2148 1430 2625 1536 4288 1860 
White 4.06 4.82 4.27 4632 3418 6005 4170 6275 4188 
Overall 1 1 1 1147 419 1349 453 1456 450 
 
Table A.3.3: Shares of income by decile 
Deciles 1993 Income 2000 Income 2008 Income 
1 0.27% 0.44% 0.40% 
2 1.03% 1.07% 1.01% 
3 1.66% 1.56% 1.52% 
4 2.21% 2.15% 2.08% 
5 3.15% 2.95% 2.78% 
6 4.33% 3.96% 3.65% 
7 6.16% 5.61% 5.35% 
8 9.61% 8.76% 8.56% 
9 17.69% 16.79% 16.57% 
10 53.89% 56.71% 58.07% 
 
Table A.3.4: Cumulative shares of income by decile 
Deciles 1993 Income 2000 Income 2008 Income 
1 0.27 0.44 0.4 
2 1.30 1.51 1.41 
3 2.96 3.07 2.93 
4 5.17 5.22 5.01 
5 8.32 8.17 7.79 
6 12.65 12.13 11.44 
7 18.81 17.74 16.79 
8 28.42 26.50 25.35 
9 46.11 43.29 41.92 
10 100 100 100 
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Table A.3.5: Shares of income components by decile 
 1993 
Income Deciles % Labour Market % Remittances % Capital % Government % Other 
1 29.57 52.27 1.15 15.02 1.99 
2 32.65 31.56 0.24 31.77 3.78 
3 39.24 25.70 0.35 31.11 3.61 
4 50.03 19.29 0.45 28.28 1.95 
5 57.54 13.60 0.86 24.31 3.69 
6 71.99 8.98 0.46 16.28 2.29 
7 78.41 5.68 0.95 11.70 3.26 
8 86.98 3.00 0.77 6.66 2.59 
9 91.31 1.56 0.78 2.08 4.28 
10 85.03 0.59 4.42 0.50 9.46 
 2000 
Income Deciles % Labour Market % Remittances % Capital % Government % Other 
1 34.90 33.45 1.39 28.92 1.34 
2 33.33 27.32 1.78 36.97 0.60 
3 36.72 29.07 1.96 31.38 0.87 
4 43.97 26.29 1.50 27.16 1.08 
5 52.59 24.23 1.56 20.46 1.17 
6 60.65 22.60 1.21 13.79 1.75 
7 68.24 17.38 1.78 10.54 2.07 
8 77.52 12.73 2.21 5.54 2.00 
9 84.71 6.04 3.97 3.09 2.19 
10 90.33 1.72 5.51 1.23 1.21 
 2008 
Income Deciles % Labour Market % Remittances % Capital % Government % Other 
1 18.75 8.14 0.29 72.70 0.10 
2 27.61 7.99 0.52 63.88 0.00 
3 33.31 7.41 0.32 57.31 1.65 
4 42.00 8.20 0.75 48.37 0.68 
5 51.40 8.26 1.83 38.23 0.28 
6 59.63 7.22 1.31 31.54 0.29 
7 69.57 4.42 2.39 23.26 0.36 
8 82.77 7.13 2.57 6.79 0.74 
9 87.26 3.60 6.34 2.62 0.18 
10 82.97 5.26 11.00 0.41 0.36 
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Table A.3.6: Household structure by decile - no zero incomes 
  NIDS 
  Number of adults  Children present  Number of workers 
Decile  Single Two+  None One+  None One Two+ 
1  32.80% 67.20%  14.38% 85.62%  72.19% 23.16% 4.65% 
2  31.29% 68.71%  11.18% 88.82%  57.60% 34.60% 7.80% 
3  28.60% 71.40%  19.18% 80.82%  51.33% 34.75% 13.93% 
4  24.05% 75.95%  22.13% 77.87%  42.80% 44.10% 13.09% 
5  19.27% 80.73%  21.79% 78.21%  38.72% 45.40% 15.88% 
6  25.73% 74.27%  34.06% 65.94%  34.31% 44.63% 21.06% 
7  33.73% 66.27%  54.05% 45.95%  30.81% 44.53% 24.67% 
8  36.07% 63.93%  56.19% 43.81%  10.99% 62.62% 26.38% 
9  39.48% 60.52%  60.23% 39.77%  12.18% 60.68% 27.14% 
10  41.19% 58.81%  67.77% 32.23%  9.99% 57.02% 32.99% 
           
  IES/LFS 
  Number of adults  Children present  Number of workers 
Decile  Single Two+  None One+  None One Two+ 
1  24.93% 75.07%  14.63% 85.37%  48.65% 36.71% 14.65% 
2  19.92% 80.08%  12.36% 87.64%  48.41% 35.54% 16.05% 
3  21.44% 78.56%  14.86% 85.14%  46.65% 35.55% 17.80% 
4  22.73% 77.27%  19.15% 80.85%  40.84% 39.87% 19.29% 
5  24.39% 75.61%  27.28% 72.72%  35.83% 42.28% 21.88% 
6  28.10% 71.90%  36.43% 63.57%  25.92% 49.95% 24.13% 
7  33.93% 66.07%  47.06% 52.94%  27.20% 49.26% 23.54% 
8  34.04% 65.96%  53.00% 47.00%  15.37% 56.35% 28.28% 
9  37.84% 62.16%  58.55% 41.45%  11.79% 56.54% 31.67% 
10  35.74% 64.26%  65.05% 34.95%  9.33% 47.54% 43.13% 
           
  SALDRU 
  Number of adults  Children present  Number of workers 
Decile  Single Two+  None One+  None One Two+ 
1  22.36% 77.64%  9.08% 90.92%  65.83% 28.38% 5.79% 
2  17.89% 82.11%  5.64% 94.36%  56.87% 32.60% 10.53% 
3  15.36% 84.64%  7.11% 92.89%  46.41% 36.74% 16.85% 
4  15.37% 84.63%  11.00% 89.00%  39.25% 41.96% 18.80% 
5  17.15% 82.85%  16.43% 83.57%  32.72% 44.42% 22.86% 
6  16.19% 83.81%  22.85% 77.15%  23.79% 47.82% 28.38% 
7  18.64% 81.36%  30.71% 69.29%  16.49% 52.74% 30.77% 
8  25.41% 74.59%  45.08% 54.92%  11.88% 53.81% 34.31% 
9  35.68% 64.32%  57.35% 42.65%  5.59% 57.42% 36.98% 
10  29.88% 70.12%  68.58% 31.42%  7.73% 41.14% 51.12% 
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Table A.3.7: Age of household head by decile - no zero incomes 
 1993  2000  2008 
Decile Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
1 0.48 0.49  0.46 0.45  0.43 0.42 
2 0.51 0.50  0.49 0.48  0.46 0.44 
3 0.51 0.50  0.49 0.47  0.48 0.48 
4 0.53 0.53  0.49 0.47  0.48 0.47 
5 0.50 0.49  0.47 0.45  0.49 0.47 
6 0.50 0.49  0.45 0.42  0.46 0.45 
7 0.48 0.45  0.46 0.43  0.48 0.47 
8 0.46 0.43  0.43 0.40  0.41 0.37 
9 0.42 0.39  0.43 0.40  0.42 0.38 
10 0.43 0.40  0.43 0.41  0.45 0.43 
 
Table A.3.8: Disparity indices 
1993 2000 2008 
90/10 
ratio 
90/50 
ratio 
90/10 
ratio 
90/50 
ratio 
90/10 
ratio 
90/50 
ratio 
28.929 6.696 27.152 7.052 29.306 7.612 
 
Table A.3.9: Generalised entropy measures of inequality 
  1993 
GE(0) 
2000 
GE(0) 
2008 
GE(0) 
1993 
GE(1) 
2000 
GE(1) 
2008 
GE(1) 
Overall 0.91 0.93 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.03 
African 0.57 0.68 0.75 0.56 0.79 0.82 
Coloured 0.36 0.52 0.53 0.34 0.52 0.57 
Asian/Indian 0.42 0.47 0.75 0.49 0.50 0.70 
White 0.35 0.43 0.47 0.37 0.43 0.44 
Within 0.52 0.64 0.70 0.44 0.60 0.64 
  57.33% 68.35% 70.06% 48.17% 60.47% 61.91% 
Between 0.39 0.30 0.30 0.47 0.40 0.39 
  42.67% 31.65% 29.94% 51.83% 39.53% 38.09% 
 
Table A.3.10: Measured "between inequality" as a % of maximum possible 
1993 
GE(0) 
2000 
GE(0) 
2008 
GE(0) 
1993 
GE(1) 
2000 
GE(1) 
2008 
GE(1) 
62.16% 44.68% 42.89% 68.61% 50.34% 47.80% 
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Table A.3.11: Poverty under different poverty lines using the NIDS 2008 data 
Poverty line = Upper (R949/month) pop p0 p1 p2 p0share p1share p2share 
African 0.79 0.80 0.52 0.38 0.90 0.92 0.93 
Coloured 0.09 0.57 0.30 0.19 0.07 0.06 0.05 
Indian/Asian 0.03 0.31 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 
White 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
TOTAL 0.70 0.44 0.32 
Poverty line = Lower (R515/month) pop p0 p1 p2 p0share p1share p2share 
African 0.79 0.64 0.34 0.22 0.93 0.94 0.95 
Coloured 0.09 0.37 0.15 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 
Indian/Asian 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 
White 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
TOTAL 0.54 0.28 0.19 
Poverty line = $1/day (R130/month) pop p0 p1 p2 p0share p1share p2share 
African 0.79 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.97 0.96 0.95 
Coloured 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Indian/Asian 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
White 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
TOTAL 0.13 0.06 0.04 
Poverty line = $1.25/day (R163/month) pop p0 p1 p2 p0share p1share p2share 
African 0.79 0.21 0.09 0.06 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Coloured 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Indian/Asian 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
White 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
TOTAL 0.18 0.08 0.05 
Poverty line = $2/day (R260/month) pop p0 p1 p2 p0share p1share p2share 
African 0.79 0.36 0.17 0.10 0.95 0.96 0.96 
Coloured 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Indian/Asian 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
White 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
TOTAL 0.30 0.14 0.08 
Poverty line = $2.5/day (R325/month) pop p0 p1 p2 p0share p1share p2share 
African 0.79 0.45 0.21 0.13 0.94 0.96 0.96 
Coloured 0.09 0.20 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 
Indian/Asian 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
White 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
TOTAL 0.38 0.18 0.11 
Poverty line =50% median pcy pop p0 p1 p2 p0share p1share p2share 
African 0.79 0.32 0.15 0.09 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Coloured 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Indian/Asian 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
White 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
TOTAL 0.27 0.12 0.07 
Poverty line =40% median pcy pop p0 p1 p2 p0share p1share p2share 
African 0.79 0.20 0.09 0.05 0.97 0.96 0.96 
Coloured 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Indian/Asian 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
White 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
TOTAL 0.16 0.07 0.05 
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Figure A.3.1: Overlaid Lorenz curves 
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Figure A.3.2: CDF’s from 1993-2008, without zero incomes 
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Figure A.3.3: CDF’s from 1993-2008, without zero incomes 
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Figure A.3.4: CDF’s by racial groups in 1993 
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Figure A.3.5: CDF’s by geotype in 2000 
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Figure A.3.6: CDF’s by geotype in 1993 
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